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Chapter 1. Introduction  
1.1 Yizegu: A Story of Access? 
 If one wants to travel from Savelugu to Kumbungu, the shortest option is a 15 
kilometer long gravel road, full of bumps and holes. This rough terrain discourages many 
regular taxi-drivers from taking the route, leaving the option of hopping on the back of one of 
the blue motorcycle-taxis. The rough ride to which this amounts, sets the scenery for the 
ethnography provided below, for it tells us a story about development in general and that of 
one small farmers community in particular. 
A Trip Down Development Lane 
After having left the paved and comfortable main road of Savelugu, the first building 
one sees is that of the District Assembly of the Savelugu-Nanton Municipality, the main 
development planning authority of the region. A few hundred meters onwards, one passes the 
office of the Lands Commission, which is located right next to regional head office of World-
Vision, one of the biggest development organizations active in Ghana. The dusty road 
accordingly takes us further into the rural area that comprises most of the Northern Region 
and occasionally passes one of the small farmers villages, scattered all over the land. More 
strikingly, both sides of the road are strewn with NGO-signs indicating what development 
projects have been undertaken there, some of which are still active today. For instance, Libga 
– a village located on the Savelugu-end of the road - profits considerably from a dam-project 
to which they are assigned custody; the irrigation fields that have sprung from it provide a 
steady source of income throughout much of the year. Also, zonal capital Moglaa hosts a 
clinic that provides basic medical services, while the neighboring Tarikpaa is home to a 
number of schools sponsored by several donor agencies.  
Moving further along the Savelugu-Kumbungu road, however, one cannot help but 
notice that, in terms of general development, the prosperity of the villages located there, 
seems rather varied. One of the villages that seems to have fallen behind in this regard, is that 
of Yizegu, painstakingly symbolized by the relatively small number of NGO-signs 
commemorating its undertaken projects
1
. When considering the extensive NGO-activity 
undertaken in the area, this village has apparently failed in directing development policy in 
                                                          
1 Two, as opposed to the seven signs for the neighboring Tarikpaa, of which the contrast can be directly observed at the crossroad that 
connects both villages. 
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their favor.  In that sense, the story of Yizegu is perhaps that of a lack of access: to “the 
development pie” provided by the dozens of developmental NGOs active in the region; and, 
more particularly, to the District Assembly, the local government institution that holds the 
knife to cut this pie and hands out the slices. 
Getting Your Slice of the Pie 
A possible explanation for this observed exclusion can then be found in the process of 
interest representation. The degree to which ‘your voice is heard’ – and thus the capability of 
making it heard – will determine the degree to which development policy is directed in your 
favor. Obviously, not every community will be equally capable of doing so and the benefits of 
development will accordingly not be equally distributed amongst its ‘beneficiaries’. This 
might be problematic as this equality is the very basis on which the notion of ‘bottom-up’ 
participation is based. Perhaps, rather than viewing it as an instrumental means of 
empowerment, the notion of participation itself requires a more critical approach What 
exactly does it mean to be at ‘the bottom’? And when ‘looking up’, what is it you see? When 
communicating your interest at the lowest level, what happens to it in face of the wide variety 
of other actors present in the same political arena? Issues of politics and power seem 
inevitably wound up in this process of interest representation and should take centre stage in 
any analysis concerned with ‘participation’. This is exactly what the provided ethnography of 
Yizegu aims to do. 
Motivation  for the Research 
 But then why an ethnography? The main motivation for this choice lies in the 
researcher’s own background in the field of Public Administration and Political Science. The 
analytical approaches in these disciplines rarely move beyond institutions as such, let alone 
attempt to open up the black boxes of what constitutes them. For me, personally, this left an 
uncomfortable blind spot. Rather than sitting at one’s desk, the appropriate thing to do was 
then to go out in the field and getting one’s hands dirty. An ethnography accordingly provided 
the appropriate means to continue where the institutional approaches had stopped. In that 
sense, this thesis tries to add the social and cultural dynamics to an institutional approach, in 
that way moving beyond institutions and filling the gaps in my knowledge. By moving across 
the  analytical borders and limitations of various disciplines, this thesis hopes to present a 
more complete an accurate picture of social reality as it is.  
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1.2 A Short Theoretical Formulation 
 A to ensure that both the reader and writer speak the same (conceptual) language, a 
short theoretical formulation will serve to straighten out the concepts central to the research of 
this thesis. For now, a general overview is given, although each respective chapter 
accordingly zooms in on what is theoretically relevant to the case at hand. Each chapter will 
thus also have a separate theoretical framework in which elements found in this section are 
provided with some elaboration and depth. Note that theoretical overlaps between the chapters 
will be found. For the sake clarity, however, some elements will be repeated.  
The Participatory Discourse 
There is a wide belief that the success of development policy is determined by the 
construction of an adequate institutional boilerplate that maximizes accountability to its users 
(Brett, 2003: 1-2). One way for NGOs – and governments - to establish this “downward 
accountability”2 is through the means of participation. The rationale behind this particular 
mechanism is that by giving the intended beneficiaries of development projects a ‘voice’ in 
the policy-formulation phase, the eventually implemented policy will better reflect their 
interests. Moreover, by having beneficiaries participate, implementers obtain feedback 
through a continuous dialogue on how the policy is doing and what should be done to change 
it. In that sense participation is different from other accountability mechanisms, such as 
evaluations or reports, as it refers to a process rather than a tool (Ebrahim, 2003: 817). The 
modes and levels of participation can vary considerably though, ranging from information 
provision and public meetings, to actual partaking in negotiation and bargaining in decision-
making processes by the intended beneficiaries (Adnan, 1992: 111; Ebrahim 2003: 817). 
We should note that in practice this process of participation by no means guarantees 
the actual inclusion of beneficiaries’ interests in the eventual policy outcome. Like most 
popular and politicized buzzwords of development, accountability and participation are given 
different meanings by different actors. Often, policies stressing participation will move little 
beyond rhetorical flourish, rather than formulating actual or actualisable goals (Fisher, 1997: 
455). Moreover, even if their
3
 ‘voices are heard’, they will merely be an additional interest to 
a political arena in which a wide variety of interests is already present. Being able to represent 
                                                          
2 Besides “upward” accountability referring to relationships with donors, foundations, and government, and “internal” accountability, where 
NGOs declare responsibility to their mission and staff (see Ebrahim, 2003: 814-815). 
3 “Intended Beneficiaries” 
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your interest - or having it represented by someone else – does not strip the process of interest 
representation from the politics and contestation inherent to it. Diverging parties will try to 
take control of the scarce resources divided in development. In that sense, development and 
politics seem inseparably woven together. Conflict and the reproduction of power-relations 
should be central focus in this regard. 
In addition, the category of ‘intended beneficiaries’ itself might prove to be 
problematic. After all, it implies a unitary group or community and thus annuls much of the 
variation and divisions to be found at this local level. Development policy is implemented 
among diverse beneficiaries with diverse interests. Results of development policy will then 
emerge from locally inflected contestations over the meanings and practices of development 
and politics (Moore, 1999: 673). The struggle involved in this process will produce ‘winners’ 
and ‘losers’. Although some will view participation possibilities as instruments of 
empowerment, others might experience them as instruments of authority and control (Li 
2007). Obscuring these dynamics, by viewing development in strict instrumentalist terms, 
may then distort our image of reality. The process of interest representation is bound to have 
specific cultural elements to it, and it is an empirical question whether the “downward” 
accountability mechanism of participation reflects this. To better understand the ways in 
which participation instruments work out ‘on the ground’, ethnographic research should then 
be conducted to capture the social meanings attributed to them. 
Development and Participation as Politics and Contestation 
The institutional practice of development policy is complex and guided by a diversity 
of interests and perspectives (Mosse, 2004: 644). The politics of participation should thus not 
be obscured if an accurate image of reality is to be obtained. Similarly, Moore (1999: 675) 
believes that we should not see development as determined by a monolithic and stable 
discursive formation that forecloses inevitable outcomes, but in terms of a politics of 
contingency and contestation. By applying the concept of cultural politics to the state-
administered Zimbabwean resettlement scheme, he provides insight into how issues and 
conflicts over tradition, legitimate authority, and political rights problematize policy 
implementation and can elucidate the apparent gap between policy and practice (Moore, 1999: 
675). Development and politics are woven together in particular localities, differentially 
deployed, and given form and substance through cultural practices (ibid.). As stated, results of 
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development policy will then emerge from locally inflected contestations over the meanings 
and practices of development and politics (Moore, 1999: 673).  
In that sense, development can perhaps best be understood as an arena of conflict 
where diverging parties try to establish political security, control over resources, as well as 
ideological justifications for their actions (Bähre, 2007: 99). Based on his fieldwork 
experiences in townships and squatter camps of Cape Town, Bähre demonstrates how conflict 
and violence are at the heart of these processes and largely determine the relative success or 
failure of development projects (2007: 81). The nexus of development, community, and state 
is characterized by ambiguity, ambivalence, and a fragmented nature (Bähre and Lecocq, 
2007: 5). This consideration should take centre stage in any analysis of development aid 
policy. 
This logic can also be applied to the process of participation. Schroeder (1999: 3) 
demonstrates how the promotion of Gambian community resource management was not 
merely a popular gesture inviting more ‘local’ participation, but rather part of a deliberate 
financial strategy to decentralize project costs by the Gambian Forestry Department. 
Moreover, through the use of formal contracts and conditionality, project managers were able 
to devolve responsibility for many of the tasks associated with forest management, without 
forfeiting managerial control (ibid.). In that sense, ‘participation’ had the community commit 
itself to a broad set of interactions with project staff, and opening itself up to inspection and 
monitoring at the government’s discretion (Schroeder, 1999: 16). Rather than producing 
greater participation of groups normally disenfranchised from the decision-making process, 
community-based development had thus been converted into a tool of structural adjustment 
(Schroeder, 1999: 18). 
The Power of De-Politicization 
But in what way does the “instrumentalist-perspective” towards participation ‘strip the 
process of interest representation from the politics and contestation inherent to it’? Firstly, it is 
important to note that the agendas of ‘empowerment’, ‘participation’, and ‘consensus’ are not 
set in the places in which they are implemented. As Kothari (2001: 143) has argued, 
programmes designed to bring in the excluded, often result in forms of control that are more 
difficult to challenge, as they reduce spaces of conflict and are of a relatively benign and 
liberal nature. Emphasizing notions of “the local”, “the community”, and consensus - as many 
of these participatory approaches do - often comes at the expense of the wider power 
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structures, dissent and confrontational politics by which they are embedded (Bühler, 2002: 4). 
By valorising the personal, the local and the community, the process of participation is de-
politicized as it neglects to analyze and challenge the power structure that suffuse/permeate it 
(Bühler, 2002: 2). It is in this light, that Hailey (2001: 99) posed the question of “how much 
participative development owes its genesis to attempts by Western governments, and (...) 
Northern aid donors to limit the power and influence of political dissidents, freedom-fighters, 
or radical Marxists”. Although the latter groups’ approaches of marginalization and exclusion 
hardly provide an attractive alternative, its patterns of power and communication should not 
be concealed.  
Besides moving past the de-politicized nature of participation, one should also ask the 
question of what interests this ‘non-politics’ serves, and what interests it may be suppressing 
(White, 1996: 14). Conflict and the reproduction of power-relations should be central focus in 
this regard. How does de-politicization manifest itself at the local level in its relation to 
models of participation? What interest does it serve in terms of NGO policy and how do the 
interests of the ‘intended beneficiaries’ fare under this condition of ‘non-politics’? Exposing 
dynamics within the category of ‘intended beneficiaries’ itself, allows us to focus our 
attention on the politics inevitably involved in the process of interest representation and 
enables us to elucidate the gap between development policy and practice. In this light, it is 
also important to underline the consequences of using the concept of ‘community’ in 
participatory approaches to development. 
Problematizing ‘The Community’ 
As Agrawal and Gibson (1999: 633) note, a community is often simplistically 
assumed to be based in one small spatial unit, sharing norms and built up from a 
homogeneous social structure. The group that is defined as ‘a community’, however, may in 
fact be highly diverse. As Li (1996: 510) has shown, it can be politically fractured and 
socially differentiated along multiple factors. Moreover, rather than being static, divisions 
within a group or community are also changeable. Although, the community may present 
itself as a unified front to perceived threats from the outside; internal struggles over land and 
resources may divide and re-divide the community (Vihemaki 2009: 32). 
 In assertions on the role of communities as agents of decentralization, participation, 
and collective action, the heterogeneity of actors within the community is often overlooked 
(Nygren 2005). In that sense, the assumed boundaries between the community and its counter-
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forces – e.g. states and markets – may be overstated (Li 2001). Population units can be 
“embedded” in the state, for instance by being historically created by the state and/or through 
the administrative ties (Li, 2001: 164-165). Being blind to these possibilities may lead to the 
available resources in development projects being ‘captured’ by local elites (Shackleton et al. 
2002). Kumar (2002) points to distinctions between gender, wealth, or status that ensure that 
the distribution of benefits will strengthen local elites while excluding most of the poor. 
Moreover, not all individuals in the community will have the needed resources and time for 
taking part in such ‘participation’ activities (Cleaver 2002). In that sense, public participation 
may reinforce existing privileges and discourage an articulation of subordinate perspectives 
(Mosse, 2001: 19) 
1.3 Ethnographic Introduction: Zooming in on Yizegu 
Despite Ghana’s apparent macroeconomic success – with a sustained economic 
growth averaging four to five percent per annum (Aryeteey & Harrigan 2000) – elaborate 
reforms
4
 have generated growing disparities between elites and the working class, between 
the rural and the urban (Chalfin, 2008: 534). An according renewed dependence on the world 
market for basic goods, and failing access to basic services such as health and education 
(Yeboah 2003), has ensured Ghana’s inclusion in the World Bank’s Highly Indebted Poor 
Country (HIPC) program and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Initiative (Whitfield 2005). 
Although Ghana is thus not an LDC, it is still subjected to high concentrations of 
development assistance, even scoring in the top 10 of highest level of ODA received (OECD 
2011). Moreover, Agyemang et al. (2009: 9) note that there is a wide diversity of INGOs and 
local NGOs operating in Ghana, covering several areas such as health, education, agriculture, 
forestry, and poverty reduction programmes such as micro-credit. 
 Particularly in the Northern region, where 60 percent of the people live below the 
national poverty level as compared to the 29 percent of the national average, considerable 
NGO activity is undertaken (Ghana Statistical Service 2008). This intense NGO activity is 
mainly centred around Tamale, the capital city of the northern region. It is often labelled as 
the ‘NGO capital of Ghana’, given the large number of International NGOs operating from 
there (Agyemang et al. 2012: 18). Moreover, as Tamale is also believed to possess “the last 
‘decent’ hotel”, it has become a veritable frontier town for the development industry (Mohan, 
2002: 140). Given the range of development issues requiring attention and a clustering of a 
                                                          
4 Dubbed by some as “neo-liberal”. 
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diverse number of development INGOs and local NGDOs in the area (Agyemang et al. 2012: 
18), the Northern region provides an excellent field-study site to examine the issue of interest 
representation and participation/ in development policy.  
 Within this Northern Region, the Savelugu/Nanton Municipal
5
 collects a large portion 
of the externally funded development assistance. The Municipal Capital Savelugu - 25 
kilometers up north from Tamale on the Bolgatanga road - even accommodates several 
(international) NGO head offices and is conveniently located right next to the Tamale airport. 
Similar to Tamale, Savelugu is expanding rapidly, evinced by its 52 percent population 
increase (over 10 years) documented by the most recent population and housing census (2010). 
However, despite having been upgraded from a district to a municipality in 2012
6
, 
Savelugu/Nanton is still a primarily rural area. The agricultural sector drives the economy and 
employs 97 percent of the labor force. The core production in this sector consists of staple 
crops and is done at the subsistence level through traditional methods on a small-scale basis. 
Much of this activity is concentrated in the 149 communities of which the municipality is 
built up, of which Yizegu is just one.  
At the south-western border of the district, about 10 kilometers into the poorly 
maintained Savelugu-Kumbungu connecting road, lies the small village of Yizegu; home to a 
farming community of about 500 people scattered over the roughly 40 compounds that 
comprise it. The majority of Yizegu’s population is of the Islamic faith, although Christianity 
(Assembly of God) is also actively practiced by some. As most communities in the Northern 
Region, Yizegu is also part of the Dagomba Kingdom, accordingly falling under the sub-
paramouncy of the neighboring Zugu. Its traditional authority is represented by a village 
Chief, who is supported by a group of companions, i.e. the heads of the different families. 
However, besides this more traditional form of administration, Yizegu is also a recognized 
‘unit’ in the Savelugu/Nanton Municipality, the smallest component of the decentralized 
administrative setup in Ghana’s local government system. Accordingly, two levels exist 
between this unit-level and the municipal-level of Savelugu/Nanton: (1) the Tarikpaa electoral 
area in which Yizegu takes part with three other villages, and (2) the Moglaa Zonal Council, 
in which it is represented along with 9 other villages from three electoral areas.  
                                                          
5 Savelugu/Nanton was upgraded in status - from a District to a Municipal - under the Legislative Instrument (LI) 2071 in 2012. It has 
population of 139,283 (2010  Census). 
 
11 
 
Families in Yizegu support themselves by smallholder farming. The purpose of this 
farming is predominantly subsistence, although some villagers are able to sell surplus yield is 
sold to return a profit (cash-crop). The Savannah climate in which this farming activity takes 
place has a distinct raining season, running from May to October. In the long dry-season to 
which this amounts, some villagers seek alternative (economic) activities (i.e. scraps-dealing, 
foodstuff trading), although many are condemned to do little else than hang around all-day 
(very high unemployment), in anticipation of the single rainfall season to return. Moreover, 
due to the conditions of the land and inadequate access to farm inputs, many farmers struggle 
to harvest enough yield to support their families throughout the dry-season, making March 
and April
7
 the hardest months of the year, not least so because they are also the hottest. Many 
villagers of Yizegu, particularly those unable to find an alternative means of income during 
the dry-season, live in relative poverty. 
1.4 Ethnographic Setup and Outline 
 The fieldwork of this thesis was undertaken over a 2-month period (January – March) 
in the village of Yizegu, located in the Northern Region of Ghana. Important to note is that 
the period of research was in the middle of the dry-season that runs from November to April. 
Although this meant that the farmers thus had plenty of time to talk to me, I did not see them 
“in action”, so to speak. The Chief assigned me to the family of the assistant-chief, which 
caringly hosted me for the length of my stay. In line with tradition, I tried to reciprocate 
through gifts accordingly through (for instance) bags of maize, a used bicycle, soap, locally 
made wooden benches, etc. As the majority of the community only speaks Dagbani, I was 
forced to rely on a translator who was also assigned to me by the Chief. Automatically, this 
individual became my first informant, although the spectrum of informants quickly widened 
in the first weeks of my stay. I usually did fieldwork for ten consecutive days after which I 
would head back to Tamale for additional interviews with NGOs and local government actors. 
A bicycle provided me the needed mobility to also visit other villages in the area, which 
helped in cross-validating some of the gathered data and information.  
A Note on Methodology 
Participant observation was the primary method of data collection and analysis during 
the fieldwork. The first month was mostly about establishing rapport and learning how to act 
                                                          
7
 In May, many farmers already harvest yams, although these are primarily meant for sales-purposes. 
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so that people went about their business as usual when I showed up. I tried to do this by 
participating in community-activities as much as possible. For instance, the workplace of the 
‘fitter’ (bicycle repairman) was a popular hang-out for the men of the village. Every day, I 
would spend about an hour just sitting there. Although the first week this meant that 
conversations were mainly about me, attention for my presence soon diminished, having the 
men seemingly go about their business “as usual”. Moreover, one of the main social activities 
for the men was peeling groundnuts. I quickly acquired this skill which allowed me to join 
different groups in conversation. Also, by making my intentions clear to as many different 
people as possible, the question of “what is he doing here” became less relevant as time went 
on, making my presence more unnoticed and in a sense even normal. A good indicator in this 
regard, was the contrast of the surprised reactions to my presence of those visiting the village
8
 
and the eventual lack of response by normal villagers after a month or so.  
For me, the participant observation method tackled the problem of reactivity and 
enhanced reliability of observations and collected data (Bernard, 2006: 355). By having the 
research subjects become more accustomed to my being with them, they also became less self-
conscious. This provided the most reliable information on the actual community situation and 
clarified what issues had to be examined in greater detail. This helped me to develop an 
intuitive understanding that gave meaning to my observations, and lowered the risks of being 
seen as an outsider that is distrusted and perhaps even boycotted (Bernard, 2006: 356; 
Berreman 2012). Moreover, through participant observation, key informants were identified 
and the quality of data collected through other methods was cross-validated. Attending 
conversations of different groups in the community, gave me an idea of which individuals 
were willing to talk or had interesting opinions on the topics of my interest. Widening the 
spectrum of key-informants was important, as my first informant and translator was assigned 
to me be the Chief. It quickly became apparent to me that he was directing me to people he 
found interesting and important (mostly his friends and family). Therefore, I needed 
informants that would also point me in other directions, as to get a more complete idea of the 
setup of the community in general.  
In a sense, the participant-observation method thus helped me to “open things up” 
(Bernard, 2006: 354). The information gathered in this phase accordingly functioned as a 
foundation on which interview questions – that are sensible to the research subjects (Bernard, 
2006: 355) – could be based. I quickly noticed that a too direct style of asking question with 
                                                          
8 What is a “saleminga” (white man) doing here? 
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regard to the notion of development often resulted in superficial answers. Moreover, I had to 
abandon much of the ‘development jargon’ used in the research proposal. Talk of ‘external 
actors’ and ‘accountability mechanisms’ did not really strike a chord with the majority of the 
villagers. It took a long time to figure out what the most effective means of acquiring 
information was. Usually this meant a rather indirect style of interviewing, having my 
respondents express themselves in their own terms, at their own pace (Bernard, 2006: 211)
9
. 
A systematic record of observations, conversations, and informal interviews was kept through 
daily field notes.   
The field-work period of two months on the same location, enabled me to interview 
people on many separate occasions. By initially keeping these interviews open-ended, I was 
able to develop a broad understanding of relevant topics and terminology (ibid.). Moreover, it 
placed me in a better position to ask the rights questions in later (analytical) phases of 
research. However, as this luxury of time was not always present – particularly when 
interviewing elite members of the community or organization – I also used semi-structured 
interviews in which I could exercise a bit more control towards people’s responses (ibid.). An 
open-ended design of these semi-structured interviews allowed for minimum control of 
informants’ responses, yet because the same questions are asked, comparison across 
informants is possible (Bernard 2006). This was particularly useful for respondents who held 
a similar position, albeit from different perspectives (i.e. chairmen of different political 
parties). The interviewing method was primarily used for identifying recurrent themes and the 
interviews conducted thus initially had an exploratory aim.  
Entering the Field 
Considering the relatively small size of the village in which I did my research, my 
entry did not go unnoticed. I chose to take the local means of transportation, i.e. the three-
wheeled motorcycle-taxi. The main consideration for this was to show to the villagers that I 
was different from the government officials and NGO-personnel they usually see driving 
around in 4x4s. Upon entering the community, I tried to keep up with local traditions as much 
as possible. I thus requested to be brought to the Chief before talking to anyone else. Here I 
                                                          
9 This last point was also the main consideration for dropping the pile-sorting method. Being part of the community and the informal 
relationships I had developed with some of the villagers, allowed me to get a lot of valuable information merely through everyday 
conversation. I believe that a formal method of data collection (i.e. pile-sorting) would have disturbed this relationship and perhaps re-
established my status as an outsider. In that sense, “it did not feel right”. Moreover, as I was already getting the information I needed, it also 
seemed unnecessary. 
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explained my intentions and handed him some ritual gifts
10
. Through a translator - a young 
man from the village who was summoned by the chief - I told him what the research was 
about (“development policy and the way they, as a community, collaborate with NGOs and 
local government actors”) and why I needed to be in this particular village (“the only way to 
get the answers was to actually stay there and see how it really is”). Although the Chief 
seemed satisfied with these answers it was apparently custom that a group of elderly men was 
consulted before he made his final decision. During this meeting I got a tour of the village, 
after which the council also wanted to ask me some questions. The main question I got – and 
that kept returning throughout the fieldwork - was whether I would bring “development” to 
the village. As a reply, I underlined that I did not have the resources of an NGO or a 
government institution; “I am a student and the only thing I can do is tell their story as it is”. 
After this, they granted me permission and told me I could come back in two days while they 
would prepare accommodation. I was accordingly assigned to the family and compound of the 
Assistant-Chief.  
1.5 Thesis Structure and Build-Up 
 This thesis is divided in three analytical chapters. Each chapter will focus on one 
element of “the Development Triangle”, consisting of the local government, the community, 
and NGOs. Although these three categories are not uniform actors that can be strictly 
separated, this setup was chosen as to provide some structure to the processed data below. 
This also entails that each chapter will not solely focus on a single node of the triad, but is 
more interested in the relationship between them (and particularly the relationship with 
Yizegu). Also, we should emphasize that in each chapter, focus will return to the community 
of Yizegu. The point of dedicating chapters to local government structures and NGOs as well, 
is that object of study (i.e. “the community” of Yizegu) cannot be analysed in isolation11. 
In terms of the analytical section of the thesis, chapter 2 focuses on the local 
governance structure of decentralization that runs all the way down to the community of 
Yizegu. For this we will take up an analytical framework that combines the perspective of 
democratic decentralization with many of the (participation) concepts identified above. Then 
we will make a case out of Ghana’s decentralized governance system and accordingly assess 
                                                          
10 Kola nuts and money: “Those who bring Kola, bring light”.  
11 After all, we do not want to fall into the trap of a form of “localism” (see Chapter 2; Mohan & Stokke 2000).   
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how it works out on “the ground” in Yizegu itself. In Chapter 3 we problematize the notion of 
“community-based development” and illustrate this by exposing the social and cultural 
dynamics of Yizegu. This chapter is of a rather descriptive nature as it identifies the different 
groups within a supposedly unified community. One of the focal points in this regard, is the 
traditional authority associated with the Dagbon Kingdom, although other groups are also 
identified. In chapter 4, we will complete the development triangle by shifting focus to the 
work of NGOs. Here, a theoretical framework will be set up on the accountability relations 
and NGO-employees get the chance to expound their own perspectives. Then we will again 
move to the local level and assess how several development projects have worked out in 
Yizegu. The focus here is on projects concerned with rural development and agriculture. 
Finally, Chapter 5 will serve to (re-)formulate our central arguments, draw according 
conclusions, and frame a discussion.    
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Chapter 2. Decentralization and Interest Representation 
In this chapter, we will focus on the system of decentralized government that was set 
up in Ghana’s ’92 constitution. To do so, we will firstly provide some theoretical context on 
the concept of democratic decentralization by explaining the perceived benefits and pitfalls. 
Accordingly, we will take up an analytical framework that underlines the notions of actors, 
powers, and accountability. Important to note is that the latter notion is conceptualized in 
relational terms. Then follows a descriptive section in which we elaborate on the specifics of 
Ghana’s system of local governance. Here, the separate levels and the way they relate to each 
other will be explained all the way down the hierarchy, which eventually brings us to the local 
community level. This takes us back to the field-work site of Yizegu, where we elaborate on 
how the decentralized government system has worked out “on the ground”. We will focus on 
the function of the Unit Committee Chairman and his relation to the Assembly-Man. Also, we 
will specify their relationship with the community and how its interests are practically 
represented. In a concluding section, we will accordingly combine all three sections and make 
our argument with regard to Ghana’s decentralized governance system.   
2.1 Analytical Framework: Democratic Decentralization 
Democratic decentralization refers to the process in which representative local 
authorities are entrusted with significant powers (Ribot, 2001). In theory, this transfer of 
powers towards the local levels will improve the efficiency and equity of local decision-
making as the presence of democratic processes encourages local authorities to serve the 
needs and desires of its constituents (Agrawal & Ribot 1999; Ribot 2002). By bringing 
government decision-making closer to its citizens, (democratic) decentralization increases 
public-sector accountability and facilitates a strategy of governance that gives powers to those 
most affected by the exercise of these powers (Agrawal & Ribot 1999). Moreover, as an 
institutionalized form of popular participation, decentralization tries to set up a governance 
infrastructure that can harness the abilities, knowledge, and incentives of rural people 
(Benjamin 2008: 2255).  
Tempering Euphoria 
Ever since the 1980s, decentralization and the means of popular participation have 
been promoted almost as a panacea to the many problems of administration and governance 
constraining local and national development, as well as a means of improving performance in 
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poverty reduction (Manor 1999; Blair 2000; Francis & James 2003). In that sense, many of 
these (development) reforms have tried to remedy the negative consequences of the post-
colonial centralized state (Benjamin, 2008: 2255). However, the empirical evidence that 
decentralization has actually improved governance, remains rather inconclusive and the 
conventional view defending its merits has often been challenged (ibid.). Several concerns 
can be raised with regard to the viability of encouraging rural poverty reduction through 
democratic decentralization (Johnson, 2001: 241).  
Firstly, in practice, democratic decentralization has trouble overcoming existing 
political and economic disparities, both within and among regions (Johnson, 2001: 521). For 
instance, development programs can be highly subject to regional biases in favor of relatively 
affluent and well-developed areas. Rural areas are particularly vulnerable in this regard, 
mainly due to their limited possibilities of raising public revenue (ibid.). Also, political 
disparities will often favor regions where local actors are exceptionally important and/or 
influential. In that sense, the distribution of development policy outcomes can be highly 
unequal. Moreover, we should note that decentralization is about devolving powers to local 
authorities; a practice that can be deeply threatening to national elites
12
 (Moore & Putzel 
1999). In that sense, it seems likely that even if central government allows the establishment 
of local autonomous authorities, substantial control may still be exercised through the means 
of performance targets, budget requirements, reporting mechanisms and the like (Manor 1999: 
60-61; Johnson 2001). As Wardell and Lund (2006: 1899-1900) observe, “contemporary 
decentralization is accompanied by increasing central government and line ministerial control, 
hollowing out local people’s participation and control”. 
Secondly, poverty may have a debilitating effect on people’s ability to engage in 
political processes (ibid.). For instance, as Dreze and Sen (1996) have argued and illustrated, 
the extent to which one is capable of obtaining and understanding information on laws, 
policies, and the rights to which one entitled is heavily dependable on the ability to read. 
Illiteracy will then keep many individuals from being informed about party-platforms, 
government policies, and the rights these may provide. This will seriously hamper their ability 
to participate in democratic processes and thus the degree to which the poor and powerless are 
represented therein. Besides literacy and information, a lack of  other ‘political tools’, such as 
                                                          
12 After all, it is to the detriment of their own powers.  
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money and power, will have a similar effect, excluding large groups from the popular 
participation in (decentralized) decision-making
13
. 
Thirdly, when introducing decentralization into a political environment characterized 
by clientage, one runs the risk of strengthening ties of patronage and further entrenching local 
elites (Francis & James, 2003: 327). In that sense, many decentralization efforts face a 
problem of (local) ‘elite capture’, perpetuating existing poverty and inequality (Johnson, 2001: 
525). A mere introduction of democratic principles without sensitivity to the cultural and 
historical context in which they are ‘implemented’, may lead to unintended and unexpected 
outcomes, particularly in rural areas where great numbers of people are often dependent on 
small numbers of local, powerful elites (Luckham et al.  2000; Johnson; ibid.). As Mandani 
(1996) observes, the African patrimonial state may then perpetuate rule over subject, rather 
than rule by citizens. In such an environment, decentralization runs more risk of bringing 
“repression closer to the people” rather than anything else (Cross & Kutengule, 2001: 6).  
Taking up an Analytical Framework 
Following Agrawal and Ribot (1999), three dimensions seem to underlie all acts of 
decentralization: actors, powers, and accountability. If one wants to analyze the extent to 
which meaningful decentralization has taken place, one will have to have some understanding 
of the powers of various actors, the domains in which they exercise their powers, and to 
whom and how they are accountable (ibid.). After all, each actor
14
 will have certain types of 
powers and will be located in particular relations of accountability (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999: 
476). To determine, however, in what way these actors are related to each other and what 
position they accordingly take, one will have to understand how their powers are historically, 
socially, and politically constituted. In decentralization, exercising these powers will take 
place at different levels of political authorities. The nature of decentralization will accordingly 
depend on who gets to exercise power and the accountability relations to which they are 
subject (ibid.) 
 But what types of powers are we talking about here? Agrawal and Ribot (1999: 477) 
distinguish four: the power (1) to create rules or modify old ones; (2) make decisions about 
                                                          
13 or any meaningful political action for that matter, as even attending a political rally can be a costly endeavor (e.g. transport costs, 
communication backlash) (see Moore & Putzel 1999).   
14 When talking about actors, we can include appointed or elected officials, NGOs, Chiefs, powerful individuals, or corporate bodies, such as 
communities, committees, and cooperatives (see Agrawal & Ribot, 1999: 476 for an overview). 
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how a particular opportunity or resource is to be used; (3) implement and insure compliance 
to the new or altered rules; and (4) adjudicate disputes that arise in the effort to create rules 
and ensure compliance
15
. Decentralization is then constituted by the enlarged powers of 
decision-making at the lower levels of the political-administrative hierarchy in relation to any 
of these four categories (ibid.). The effectiveness of this decentralization, however, will rather 
depend on the third dimension identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999: 478); namely, that of 
accountability. The central premise here, is that whenever actors are not accountable to their 
constituents, but rather to themselves or superiors within the structure of government, 
decentralization will not meet its stated objectives.  
For analytical purposes, it is important to emphasize at this point that accountability 
has a relational nature (ibid.). A central challenge is then identifying the actors among whom 
relations of accountability exist and analyzing the mechanisms through which “counterpowers” 
are exercised by those subject to actors holding decentralized powers. In that sense, rather 
than being in a position of exteriority of power, accountability depends on the exercise of a 
counterpower to balance arbitrary action (cf. Foucault). As mentioned earlier, the distinction 
between downward and upward accountability is crucially important in this regard. Here, we 
are more interested in the former, however, i.e. the exercise of accountability by constituents 
as important countervailing power to those that receive powers from the state on behalf of 
them. This “exercise of accountability” manifests itself in many different forms, varying from 
elections and referenda, to participation and information provision. Doing this effectively, can 
broaden participation of local populations and enhance responsiveness of empowered actors 
(Agrawal & Ribot, 1999: 479).  
2.2 A System of Local Governance: The Case of Ghana 
A System of Local Governance 
 The decentralization policy implemented in Ghana, resonates with a wider 
(international) agenda of good governance and participatory democracy (Ayee 2003). By 
ensuring popular citizen participation and ownership at the local level, governments all over 
the world have tried to make the public sector more efficient, accountable, and responsive to 
the (local) needs of its citizens (Ahoi 2001). For the Ghanaian context, Offei-Oboagye (2004: 
2) sees how the Ghanaian government has aspired to (1) provide more responsive, equitable, 
                                                          
15 i.e. legislative (1), executive (2 & 3), and judicial (4) powers.   
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and participatory development, (2) bring government and decision-making nearer to the 
people as well as quickening the process of decision-making, and (3) establish a training 
ground for political activity. Or, as stated in the Constitution of 1992, the Local Government 
Act would make “democracy a reality by decentralizing the administrative and financial 
machinery of government to the regions and districts and by affording all possible 
opportunities to the people to participate in decision-making at every level in national life and 
in government” (Ghana 1992). 
Under the Local Government Act of 1993 (462), Metropolitan, Municipal and District 
Assemblies were instituted as the local development planning authority, responsible for the 
overall development of the District. As stated in section 10 of this act, “an assembly shall 
exercise political and administrative authority in the District, provide guidance, give direction 
to and supervise all other administrative authorities”. For these purposes, it exercises 
deliberative, legislative, and executive functions. Moreover, the assembly should act in 
cooperation with ‘appropriate public cooperation, statutory body, or NGO’, while such public 
cooperation, statutory body, or organization has the duty to co-operate with the Assembly. In 
terms of development, all actors - including NGOs - are thus supposed to work through the 
assembly, making it the main initiator, facilitator, and executioner of development activities in 
their respective districts (Der Bebelleh & Nobabumah, 2013: 12). The local government act 
includes a list of 86 specific responsibilities assigned to them, ranging from provision of basic 
services in education, health, water supply, and sanitation to public safety and revenue 
collection (Ayee, 2008: 241). 
 The District Assembly works through committees, of which the Executive Committee 
(Section 19) is most important. This committee is ‘responsible for the performance of the 
executive and administrative functions of the District Assembly (19). The Chairman of the 
Executive Committee is the District Chief Executive who presides the meetings and ‘is 
responsible for the day-to-day performance of the executive and administrative functions of 
the assembly (20). This individual is nominated by central government and elected by a two-
thirds majority of assembly members present and voting. He is eventually appointed by the 
President, making him/her the chief the main representative of central government at the 
district level.  
A District is divided is into a number of electoral areas that hold (nonpartisan) 
elections for determining the individual that represents them in the assembly. These chosen 
21 
 
assembly-members (70 percent of total number of seats) are complemented by individuals 
appointed by the President. These appointments mainly serve the purpose of affirmative 
action and the infusion of special skills, experience, and knowledge into the assembly (Der 
Bebelleh & Nobabumah, 2013: 16). Members of the assembly partake in meetings of the 
committees to which they are assigned, and vote and debate in the general meeting of the 
District Assembly where the main policy-decisions are made. To do this properly, an 
assembly member is expected to ‘maintain close contact with, and consult the people of the 
electoral area on issues to be discussed in the District Assembly and collate their views, 
opinions and proposals’ (16). They are accordingly expected to present these views, opinions, 
and proposal to the Assembly, as to ensure that the community’s interests are taken into 
account in the eventual decision-making process. 
Figure 1. Local Governance Structure  
 
Source: Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), 2007. 
  As seen in figure 1, there are also sub-district structures present in Ghana’s Local 
Governance system. These sub-structures do not have legislative or rating powers, but 
function on the basis of powers delegated to them by the District Assembly. Firstly, there are 
town, area or zonal councils, with the given name dependent on the settlement size (Crawford, 
2004: 13). These are not elective bodies, but are composed of representative from institutions 
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above and below it, i.e. the District Assembly and Unit Committees, as well as government 
appointees selected by the DCE and approved by the President (ibid.). Ayee (2000: 17) 
describes their role as a “rallying point of local enthusiasm in support of the development 
objectives of the DAs”. According to Crawford (2004: 13), these councils are essentially 
implementing agencies. Then at the lowest level of the local governance structure, you have 
the Unit Committees that cover the smaller settlements. These units consist of both elected 
members and government appointees, although a recent modification has reduced their size 
from 15 to 5. The UCs are essentially the most decentralized implementing agencies of the 
system, performing administrative functions such as births and deaths registration, public 
education campaigns, revenue raising, and the organization of communal labour for local 
projects (Ayee, 2000: 18; Crawford, 2004: 13).   
Although, the different levels seem to fit nicely and seems to provide a (legislative) 
structure for effective community interest representation, question remains in what ways this 
Local Governance structure actually given the local citizenry the opportunity to participate in 
development activities. This is assessed by using Yizegu – a recognized unit – as a case.   
2.3 Representing Your Interest  
 In Ghana’s decentralized local government system, Yizegu is a recognized unit. The 
main face of this institution is the Unit Committee Chairman. For Yizegu, this function is 
fulfilled by Laseroms, a man in his 40s who is also the ‘fitter’16 of the village. Although, an 
election is to be held every 4 years, Laseroms’ election was already 20 years ago and no-one 
has felt the need to call a new one ever since. As he claims, “I guess everybody is pretty 
happy, no-one wants to challenge me”. At face-value, Laseroms seems to be an appropriate 
choice. As the fitter he is almost always at the workshop, which also happens to be one of the 
more important social hubs of the village. All day, men from all over the village drop by and 
hang out. Even people from other villages that are merely passing by, feel the need to stop and 
greet everyone who is present. At the end of the afternoon, the zest is at its height when up to 
20 men sit around, lively discussing various topics, ranging from football to politics. By 
actively partaking in these discussions, Laseroms automatically keeps himself informed and 
informs the others, whether it his intention or not.   
 Laseroms describes his function as being the “the head of the community. If there are 
any problems, or things have to be done with relation to development, people come to me”. In 
                                                          
16 Bike’s repair man 
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terms of accordingly communicating these problems “upwards”, the Unit Committee first 
takes its issues to the Zonal Council in Moglaa, where they decide whether their issues are 
severe enough to take them to the District. In that sense, Laseroms seems well informed about 
the proceedings as specified in the Local Government Act. Also, he works a lot with the 
Assembly-Man, who represents a total of 4 villages (Tarikpaa Electoral Area). In consultation 
with Laseroms and the three other chairmen, the Assembly-Man – who is from Langa – sends 
a letter to the District Chief Executive every two weeks. They can then do little else than 
await a response on what can be done, although the most common response is that “they will 
do something when they have money”.  
Important to note, is that the position of the UC-chairman is not party-politically 
affiliated. Laseroms is held to be neutral in this regard as he was elected on the basis of 
individuality. The types of problems he has recently been involved with were about getting 
electricity for the entire village and getting connected to the water pipelines. There have also 
been some issues concerning the land, particularly on “who gets to farm where”. This is also 
why they want to take a petition to the Chief of Zugu so they can settle this issue once and for 
all. Interestingly enough, the land of Zugu is divided over two districts: 6 villages fall under 
the Kumbungu District, while 2 villages – including Yizegu – fall within the jurisdiction of 
the Savelugu-Nanton District. In that sense, the Unit-Committee officer is forced to work 
outside government channels, as the DA has no authority in the matter. In that sense, the 
administrative boundaries do not seem to coincide with actual settlement patterns. Laseroms, 
however, did not believe this misfit to be problematic: “The Chief of Zugu is about the land. 
Everybody knows it is his, also in the District”. In terms of further communication with the 
Traditional Authority, the Unit Committee Chairman tells me that “the Chief doesn’t really 
care. Sometimes we get his blessing if we have big plans, but besides that he doesn’t mind if 
we don’t consult him”17. 
So in what forms have I seen Laseroms in action? In the period that I was there, I have 
seen him check damaged roofs after families had complained that they did not have the 
money to fix it. Unfortunately, there was little Laseroms could do. Also whenever the 
electricity broke down Laseroms usually notified the “people from Savelugu” who would then 
come by to fix it. I have also seem him perform some tax collecting duties, although this does 
not really come close to the professional standards as specified by the Local Government Act. 
                                                          
17 The Chief did actually care: he felt disrespected but was to proud to say anything about it (see chapter 3). 
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For instance, the water pomp often needs maintenance and all families pay a small amount of 
tax to create a financial buffer. However, Laseroms cannot write and has no staff to do it for 
him. That is why he would usually dictate the names of the families to one of the younger 
boys, who would write it down in his school notebook
18
. In this somewhat comical fashion, he 
thus kept track of how much money he needed to collect from each family: it was not really a 
matter of serious accounting. In that sense, material support (i.e. staff, office supplies) for 
properly fulfilling his functions seems rather low. You can, however, hardly blame Laseroms 
for conducting his affairs in this fashion. After all, being a Unit Committee Chairman in a 
rural village is basically voluntary work; there is no financial or material compensation what 
so ever.  
 With regard to the composition of the rest of the unit committee, something strange 
has happened. The Local Government Act (462) originally designated that each unit would 
have 15 members, of which 10 would be elected and 5 appointed by the District Chief 
Executive. As one of my key informant explains, “all political parties, religions, the women, 
the chiefs, were represented here. When someone comes to the village they do the talking”19. 
In other words, a body in which all interests are represented. However, later desk-research 
revealed that in 2010 an Established Legal Instrument of Local Government has dictated that 
the unit committee size was to be reduced from 15 to 5 and that the designated electoral areas 
became the basic unit for the unit committees. Apparently, the shift to the electoral area was 
implement correctly, as Laseroms also claims to represent Yizegu in an electoral area 
committee on which he was rather vague. However, the old structure in which Laseroms is the 
chairman of the Yizegu unit and the committee has 14 other members seems to have remained 
intact. All villagers seem unaware that in the new setup, the Unit as they perceive it (i.e. 15 
members representing their own village) formally no longer exists.  
The Assembly-Man 
 Enoch, who is one of the more well-off villagers and a good friend of Laseroms, was 
an assembly-man for 8 years. In several talks, he fills me in on what the function entails and 
what its relationship is to that of the unit committee chairman. As opposed to Laseroms, who 
                                                          
18 In the meantime he was still fixing a bike.  
19 Although one of my key informants also claims that a groups five often act as representative of the village, for  instance in talks with 
NGOs. The five individuals are: Laseroms (Unit Committee), Enoch (former assembly Man, the respective chairmen of the NDC and NPP, 
and a Women’s Representative. 
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only speaks Dagbani, Enoch’s masters the English language fairly well, making interviewing 
considerably easier.  
In 2003, Enoch was elected as the assembly-man for the Tarikpaa Electoral area. 
Besides Yizegu, he thus also represented the villages of Langa, Jirikpani, and Tarikpaa. To 
enter the election he had “to fill in a few forms and a photo. I also needed signatures of 12 
people that could vouch for me. Then the campaigning starts and I won two times”. Enoch 
explains to me that formally party-politics are kept out of the elections, although informally 
they are definitely involved: “They will try push their preferred candidates, especially in 
important areas. The Chiefs do the same by supporting their personal favourite or giving them 
funds for campaigning”. Particularly this last point seems rather important as getting elected 
apparently can be a rather costly endeavour. For instance, if you want to get elected for the 
Tarikpaa Electoral Area, you not only have to win over your own village, but also the at least 
one of the others. Although the public debates that are organized around this time draw a lot 
of attention, the key is also in satisfying the village elites. This is usually done through gifts, 
i.e. cattle, crops, or money. Although the elections are thus open, not many villagers have the 
resources to seriously enter them. In fact, the number of people that would have the financial 
means to pull it off in Yizegu amounts to only a handful.  
In terms of representing the community’s interest, Enoch explains that he usually tried 
to forward his problems in the committees in which he worked at the District level (see 
section on Ghana’s decentralized government system above). Everything that could not be 
discussed there, he tried to “squeeze in his speaking time at the general assembly meeting”. In 
that sense, assembly men are basically lobbying for their community’s needs. Whatever is 
discussed and decided in the assembly, he feeds to the unit committee chairmen with which 
he was concerned at the electoral level. If the issue was of a specific village’s concern, he 
would talk to the committee chairmen on an individual basis, “otherwise I would just call 
them all together in a general meeting. With the Unit Committee Chairmen you have to be a 
real team”. Then they would take up their issues to the Area Council Meeting after which the 
outcome of all these meetings would be reported back to the District Assembly. In that sense, 
the interest and preferences of a community pass a few stations before at arrives in the (local) 
central decision-making arena.   
 The former assembly-man also explains that the districts work with short-, medium-, 
and long-term plans. These are constituted by the data collected from peer-ranking of 
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problems within the community themselves. Each year the community gets to make a list of 
the ten development priorities they have. The District collects the lists of all units in their 
jurisdiction and accordingly develop the plans that are the guidelines for general development 
policy in the region
20 . According to Enoch, “everybody needs to stick to these plans, 
including the NGOs”. We should note, however, that the plans of the district are accordingly 
harmonized at the regional level, after which the central government sets up a Development 
Policy Framework to which all districts and regions have to be accountable. As interviews 
with local government employees later revealed, this is done through extensive budgets
21
 and 
policy plans. 
Communicating it to the Rest of Community 
In terms of communicating with the community, Zachary – a politically active NDC 
member and the younger brother of Enoch - explains that ‘each villager can take his problems 
to Laseroms. A small boy will then beat the drum to summon everyone to the Chief’s palace 
and here they discuss what can be done. The assembly-man will usually also be present at 
these meetings so can take it up to the area council or the District Chief if necessary”. If they 
have a very big issue, like building a clinic or school, the community will try to go straight to 
the District Chief Executive. They will then bring along “a goat, guineafowls, and some yams 
to satisfy him”. The DCE then gives his advise and if the issue is important enough he 
promises to send a letter to central government. A public meeting of the kind described by 
Zachary, however, did not take place during my time with the community. Apparently there 
was not much to discuss.  
Also, as Enoch has already explained, each year the community gathers to formulate 
their top 10 priorities in terms of development. This meeting is presided by the Unit Chairman 
and the Assembly-man will also be there. The list then gets send up to the District-level but 
apparently the villagers do not really get much response. Although, it is turned into a 
“Medium-Term Development” plan, none of the villagers really have an idea of what is in this 
plan. Access to information is severely lacking. The way in which information usually flows 
back to the village is in a rather informal manner (cf. Laseroms hanging out at his workshop). 
As Enoch explains, “Laseroms tells something to me, I tell it to Nathaniel, and he tells it to 
                                                          
20 However, all these plans have to be compatible to the plan higher up the hierarchy: i.e. the districts medium-term development plan will 
have to be in accordance with the region. The region’s  plans accordingly have to fit into that of the state. 
21 Also because the District receive financing from central government, on which they have to specify exactly what is done with the money. 
This budget has to be approved by the ministry of finance.  
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five others people and this goes on till the whole village knows. That is how we communicate 
here”. In terms of getting information from  the District, I also get the feeling that it is a big 
difference whether the Assembly-man is from your village, as was the case with Enoch, or 
whether he is from Langa, which is the case now. In the current situation, Laseroms is the 
only person who regularly sees him as he does not visit the village very often
22
. At least 
Enoch would come hang out the at the workplace. With regard to the District Chief Executive 
contact frequencies are even more rare. As Zachary explains, “the previous DC rarely visited, 
nor did his staff. The new one has only just been appointed, but we have not seen him yet”.  
Getting your Slice of the Pie 
Although the bodies of the decentralized governance system are recognized in the 
village, it seems that not a lot gets done through these official government channels. Interests 
are represented, be it through talking about the top ten development priorities of the village or 
telling your problems to Laseroms who accordingly has the Assembly-man send a letter to the 
District Chief Executive. There is little response however. Oddly enough, much of the anger 
is directed towards the President, who – as fierce campaigning had them believe -  “would 
make things better”. Many villagers, however, seem unaware that in the Decentralized 
Government System, much of the responsibility is with themselves. They have to articulate 
their problems, mobilize and organize themselves. A majority of the villagers, however, 
patiently wait for “them” to come to us. Then again, the ones that do act usually do so through 
rather informal channels.  
An illustrating story in this regard, is the way in which the village eventually was 
connected to the electricity grid in 2007. Although it was not yet their turn, Yizegu was slid in 
front of several other villages on the waiting list, because, as Kassim. and Nathaniel
23
 claim 
“the old DC really likes this village”. Especially Nathaniel, who operates as an “area 
connector”24 and is a well-respected NPP-member, could mobilize his connections to get 
things done in this regard. During this time, they were able to communicate directly with the 
DC, “who is from this region”. Some describe him as “a friend of the village” and as his term 
was coming to an end “he wanted to give us something to remember him by”. In this fashion, 
some people from Yizegu were able to direct a considerable degree of development policy in 
their favour. According to the Kassim, these were better times for the village in terms of 
                                                          
22 In the two months I was there, I haven’t seen him once. 
23 Two active NPP members: Kassim is the founder of the local division (and also the assistant-chief), Nathaniel the “area connector”. 
24 Meaning that he brings together the local chairmen of the region, whenever there is a problem. 
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development; because of the good connections within the NPP, the District Chief was more 
easily approachable. This advantage, however, has faded since the NDC has come to power. 
According to Kassim and Nathaniel, the DC that recently stepped down “did nothing for the 
village. He doesn’t care. He never even visited the village. The guys from the NDC don’t 
have the same connections we had”.   
In terms of coming into contact with NGOs, the village also rely on these types of 
“personal connections”. Although in the local government system, as Enoch explains, “the 
village itself does not really talk to NGOs as this is mostly done at the District-level”, many 
villagers take matters into their own hands. For instance, their participation in one of the 
financial NGOs supplying farm inputs was initially established through “a friend from 
Savelugu” who had connections in both the village and NGO. Similarly, a former assembly-
man in Kumbungu who had some friends in the village set them up with a micro-credit 
programme. Even in my time with the village, similar cases could be seen. For instance, a 
brother of the Assistant-Chief was coming back from Togo and had started an NGO that was 
interested in building a school. Kasssim accordingly convinced his brother that he should do it 
in Yizegu. Whether these sort of programmes are eventually beneficial and sustainable to the 
community remains to be seen
25
. However, it seems clear that a lack of results coming from 
the District, forces them to work outside of official government channels in order to improve 
their own situation.  
The Local Government Level 
Talks with these “official channels” eventually revealed that it are exactly these sorts 
of informal means of getting your “slice of the cake” that the Local Government Act wants to 
eradicate. After all, as the Director of the Institute of Local Governance Studies put it, it 
“hampers their ability coordinate and facilitate sustainable development policy” (see chapter 4 
as well). Sometimes, the NGOs themselves also go directly to the communities, while 
everything should be channelled through the District. As the Coordinating Director of the 
Savelugu-Nanton District explains, “we are the first point of entry. NGOs come to us, and we 
will ask them why they are here, what they want. If it fits within our development plans, we 
will accordingly tell them were to go. We will identify what communities need the aid the 
most. Then we refer them to the zonal councils and we do the monitoring and coordinating at 
the district level”. 
                                                          
25 A lot of them pull out at the last moment. 
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In an interview, the same Coordinating Director further clarifies the local government 
setup. Ideally, the Unit Committee is responsible for the actual implementation, while the 
Zonal Areas and District Assemblies are there to monitor and supervise. The Local 
Government Act specifies that Unit Committee take their problems to the Zonal Areas and 
that they try to solve it from there. If necessary the Zonal Area can then take its problems to 
the District and then can see what can be done to solve them. In practice, however, the Zonal 
Area is completely surpassed. Unit Committees and Assemblyman often take their problems 
straight to the District Chief Executive, while it is actually the Zonal Head that should 
communicate with the DC. This is predominantly because the Zonal Areas lack the resources 
and institutional capacity to fulfil its duties properly. This is particularly the case for the 
Moglaa Zonal Area of which Yizegu is part. As the CD explains, “they cannot recruit any 
staff because there is no money. They rarely hold meetings while the law dictates that should 
do so at least four times a year. These should be organized, recorded, and documented by the 
core staff. However, there is no core staff. A big indicator that the local government system is 
not functioning properly, is the fact that village just come marching into our office to talk to 
the DCE. The assembly-men should know better”. The Coordinating Director believes that 
“the laws are there, but there are no adequate structures or competent personnel”. 
2.4 Concluding Remarks 
 So, what have we seen in terms of democratic decentralization and interest 
representation? In terms of legislation, the Local Government Act provides an elaborate 
framework. All institutions and sub-structures (District Assemblies, Zonal Areas, Unit 
Committees) are ascribed with a number of functions and powers that should allow them to 
fulfil their duties properly. However, just because the laws are there, does not mean 
everything functions properly. For this you need enforcement and institutionalization. So, has 
this been the case? Do the structures allow a small community like Yizegu to represent its 
interests and to have a say in – or at least inform -  the District’s decision-making and policy? 
In other words, are they able to get their slice of the pie? 
 The first thing to note is that our analytical framework made a strict distinction 
between actors holding decentralized power and the constituents. The degree to which the 
latter group could exercise “counterpowers” towards the former, would accordingly determine 
the degree to which decentralization was successful in terms responsiveness and efficiency. 
However, if one were to apply this analytical categorization to Laseroms (as a unit committee 
30 
 
chairman) and the community, one will start seeing things that just are not there. Partly, this 
has to do with the degree to which the unit committee is institutionalized; rather than a 
professional implementing agency, we are talking about the local fitter that goes to “a meeting” 
once every few weeks. The rest of his time, he is just as much a part of the community as 
everyone else. Although this informal and cordial relationship will probably keep him 
accountability to the community - after all, he could show his face if he were not – the 
question is whether it really matters. Will the District - as the local development planning 
authority that actually formulates policy - feel a similar a pressure that forces them to be 
accountable and align their policy with its constituents’ interests?  
 Here, things get more problematic. This primarily has to do with the fact that the 
Zonal Areas lacks the institutional capacity and resources to properly fulfill its functions. 
Although the unit committee members occasionally see each other at the zonal area platform, 
this interaction is more of an informal nature, rather than an institutionalized decision-making 
body, i.e. it does not live up to its specified form in the Local Government Act. Therefore, 
communities and assemblymen often choose to represent their interests separately and directly, 
leading to frustration at the District itself and undermining the potential power of zonal areas 
to exercise accountability towards the District. After all, the many voices of all units in the 
District will drown each other out, making it difficult for the District to formulate any 
meaningful policy.  
Moreover, when looking at the setup of the decentralized government system in 
relation to national policy, one gets the feeling that the ‘downward accountability’ propagated 
in decentralized government, is severely hampered by increasing central government controls. 
For instance, although the Community gets to formulate its top ten priorities, these interests 
are accordingly mashed together at the District Level in the District’s Short/Medium/Long 
Term Development Plan. All district’s plans are then harmonized at the regional level and 
forwarded to the National Development Planning Commission which formulates a 
Development Policy Framework. This document is leading for all development policy in 
Ghana and all districts have to responsible to it. Obviously, this looks nice on paper; whether 
it really constitutes “downward accountability” is to be questioned however. For instance, the 
Districts are highly dependent on central government’s financing. For this they have to be 
accountable through elaborate budget documents that have to approved by the respective 
national ministries. As Wardell and Lund (2006: 1899-1900) already observed, this may 
hollow out local people’s participation and control. 
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However, even if the policy formulation phase is successful and communities can 
effectively represent their interests, the capacity to implement these policies and strategies 
effectively and sustainably will determine whether the constituents will actually notice a 
difference. Here, the prospects are grim. One need only a glance into the District’s budget to 
see that there is not really any money to implement any serious policy what so ever. The 
promised funds from central government often come late (or not at all) and are incomplete. 
The internal revenue is less than 1 cedi per civilian
26
, while 80 percent of the budget comes 
from external funding. Seventy per cent of the budget is accordingly taken up by salaries. In 
other words, the District as the main governmental actor responsible for implementing and 
coordinating development policy has neither the means nor the institutional capacity to bring 
about any noticeable change for its constituents. 
As mentioned, each year the community is allowed to give a list with their top 10 
priorities in terms of developmental goals. They send this list to the district but nothing really 
ever gets done about it. To the village this is a sign of corrupt politicians, assembly-men who 
do not listen, and NGOs that won’t help them. However, the financial and material constraints 
of the District make sure their hands are tied as well. In that sense, having the community 
participate gets their hopes up initially, but only leads to more disappointment in the long run. 
This dissatisfaction has the community take matters into their own hands, often leading to 
success (e.g. getting connected to the electricity grid and securing development projects). 
However, this strategy seriously hampers the coordinating capacity of the district and will not 
make for effective and sustainable development policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 About 30 euro-cent 
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Chapter 3. Taking the Unit out of Community  
 In our short theoretical framework (see introduction) we have already problematized, 
the notion of community to some extent. In the last chapter, however, we have mainly stuck to 
the institutional build-up as expounded in the decentralized governance system. In that sense, 
we have treated the community almost as a uniform actor (i.e. constituents.). However,  as Li 
(1996: 510) has shown, a community can be politically fractured and socially differentiated 
along multiple factors. In this chapter, we attempt to expose this complexity by adding social 
and cultural dynamics. In that sense, we will take the unit out of community. To do so, we 
first set up a (short) theoretical framework that continues where the introduction has left off. 
Here we will criticize an analytical position that Mohan and Stokke (2000) refer to as 
“localism”. Then follows a rather descriptive section in which we intend to expose the 
heterogeneity of actors within the community itself. A first emphasis here is on traditional 
authority in the Dagbon context, after which we consecutively elaborate on other relevant 
groups and dimensions in Yizegu’s community. A concluding section then serves to assess 
what consequences this heterogeneity has for the issues of interest representation and 
participation, with which we have dealt earlier.  
3.1 Analytical Framework: Problematizing “the Community” 
When talking about community-based development, development policies often rely 
“on communities to use their social capital to organize themselves and participate in 
development processes” (Mansuri & Rao, 2004: 6, italics mine). This leaves us with 
ambiguous concepts such as participation, communities and social capital. As participation 
has already been dealt with to a considerable degree and an elaborate treatment of the notion 
of social capital exceeds the scope of this paper, both will remain in the background 
throughout the rest of this section. Here, we will mainly focus on the notion of the 
“community” by highlighting its problematic nature.  
Problematizing the Community 
 Development projects are typically implemented in a unit referred to as a community 
(Mansuri & Rao, 2004: 8). When talking about the notion of the community, literature on 
development policy generally seems to refer to “a culturally and politically homogeneous 
social system or one that at least implicitly is internally cohesive and more or less harmonious, 
such as an administratively defined locale (tribal area or neighbourhood) or a common interest 
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group (community of weavers or potters)” (ibid.). However, as we have already argued in e 
the introduction, this simplistic conception may severely distort our image of reality; the 
composition of “communities” can be highly diverse and is far from static (cf. Agrawal & 
Gibson 1999; Li 2001).  
Analytically, Mansuri and Rao (2004: 8) see how the conventional notion of “the 
community” is problematic on at least two levels. Firstly, it is rather difficult to 
straightforwardly define the geographical and conceptual boundaries of a community as such. 
Administrative boundaries may not coincide with actual settlement patterns
27
, which may 
render them meaningless. Moreover, increasing mobility and temporary migration may 
constantly alter what is understood as “the community”. In that sense, we are dealing with 
something fluent rather than static. On top of this, factional, ethnical, and religious identities 
will further complicate the picture (ibid.). In that sense, the heterogeneity of actors within a 
community is often overlooked (Nygren 2005), while the assumed boundaries between the 
community and its counter-forces – e.g. states and markets – are perhaps overstated (Li 2001). 
Secondly, an unqualified use of “community” may obscure local structures of 
economic and social power that are likely to strongly influence policy outcomes (ibid.). For 
instance, Kumar (2002) points to distinctions between gender, wealth, or status that ensure 
that the distribution of benefits of these policies will strengthen local elites while excluding 
most of the poor. We should note that “community” is a concept often used by state and other 
organizations, rather than the people itself, and may then carry connotations of consensus and 
needs determined within parameters set by outsiders (Nelson & Wright 1995). Its existence is 
then perhaps more a ‘construction’ rather than an organic form (Mansuri & Rao, 2004: 8). 
Moreover, when considering that this construction has strong resonances with the ideology 
and system of shared values of many NGOs (Blaikie 2000: 1046), we should note that 
embracing its one-sided conceptualization might conceal conflict and powerful interests 
expected to be present at the intra-community level.  
Beyond Localism 
It should by now be clear that a community is not a site of unpenetrated, local and 
authentic alterity and cultural difference (ibid.). Rather than taking up a form of “localism” 
that essentializes the local as a discrete and bounded places that host relatively homogeneous 
                                                          
27 As we have seen in the case of Yizegu, i.e. the borders of the Zugu traditional authority vs. the borders of the Tarikpaa Elecotral Area. 
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communities, we should opt for a global sense of place (Mohan & Stokke 2000) As to restore 
the role of the national and the global (for understanding the local), it is then perhaps better to 
understand communities in line with recent understandings of place within human geography. 
From this perspective, “places are held to be constituted by social, economic, political, and 
cultural relations, and flows of commodities, information and people that extend far beyond a 
given locality” (Mohan & Stokke, 2000: 263). The point is then not that the local should be 
rejected as a basis for empowerment, but rather that we should move past analytical 
dichotomies - like state/society and local/global - if our analyses are to have any relevance (cf. 
Tsing 2000).  
3.2 The Importance of Traditional Authority 
 The elephant in the room, with regard to the social and cultural context of our present 
case is the traditional authority that plays an important role in the everyday life of the 
villagers. Yizegu falls under the Kingdom of Dagbon, established around 1600 by a group of 
migrant cavalrymen imposing themselves on stateless people
28
 (Staniland 1975; Pellow 2011). 
The Kingdom is located in the Northern Region of Ghana and is about 9,611 square miles in 
surface. The Dagbon-people call themselves Dagbamba (anglicized as Dagomba), although 
other ethnic groups - such as Konkomba, Anufo, Basari, etc. - also inhabit the region. In that 
sense, Dagbon is a multi-ethnic society with a population of more than 1 million inhabitants
29
 
(Tonah, 2012: 5). Although the area is mostly rural, it has several urban settlements, of which 
Tamale, Yendi, and Savelugu are most well known. The population is overwhelmingly 
Muslim (76 percent) with ancestor worship common amongst the rural population (GSS 2002, 
Tonah, ibid.).  
Dagbon is a centralized, hierarchical state under the leadership of the Ya-Na, who 
resides in Yendi (Tonah, 2012: 6). Despite the entrenchment of democratic rule and the 
expansion of state powers, particularly since the return to civilian rule in 1992, the importance 
of the chieftaincy institution has remained in the Northern Region (Tonah, 2012: 1). The state 
is built up of several levels of authority, each administered by a kingship-, paramount-, 
divisional- or settlement-Chief. Chiefs at one level of the political hierarchy owe allegiance to 
the appointing Chief, one level above them (ibid.). The Ya-Na also appoints royal members to 
administer the main settlements under his direct authority. Despite being accountable to those 
                                                          
28
 Note that some scholars go as far back as the 15th and even the 14th  century (McGaffey 2006; Tonah, 2012). 
29
 An estimate based on a 2010 census, in which the Northern Region population was established at 2,468,557. 
The Dagomba constitute about 41% of this population.  
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that appoint them, Chiefs at each level have considerable autonomy in administering the area 
under their control (Staniland 1975; Anamzoya 2008).  
Chiefs are chosen from members of the royal group, in a political system described by 
Bukrum (2004) as a “rotating chieftaincy”. This means that Chiefs that are initially appointed 
to the settlement and divisional levels will always aspire to a higher paramouncy position. 
Chieftaincies are ranked, and Chiefly progression is channelled more and more narrowly as 
one rises to “the Skin” of Yendi (Pellow, 2011: 135). Besides being a prestigious position 
demanding respect amongst their subjects, Chiefs also have access to considerable resources 
including the labour of their subjects, land
30
, livestock, minerals, water, and trees of economic 
value (Tonah, 2011: 1). This makes the contest for Chieftaincy titles highly competitive. 
Becoming a Chief is “not merely a contest between individual members of the royal group but 
involves the contestants’ families, lineages and clans as well as their friends and support” 
(Hagan, 2006; Tonah, 2011: 1).  
It is important to note that the tribe can be divided into two clans; the Abudu and 
Andani, each an offshoot of one of the two sons of Ya-Na Yakubu, who died in the late 19
th
 
century (Staniland 1975; Pellow, 2011: 135). Succession over this paramount position has 
since then always led to tension, sometimes lapsing into violence. The most recent example is 
the bloody murder of the Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II and 28 of his followers in 2002 (see 
Mahama 2009a). The conflict on who has the legitimate claim to install the Ya-Na seems to 
resurface with each change of government, as the feuding clans jockey for support among the 
ruling elites and political parties (Tonah, 2011: 1). The entanglement of the two main political 
parties with the two factions in the conflict, is also seen as one of the main instigators of the 
dramatic events in 2002 (Mahama 2009a).  
Indirect Rule 
 In this light, an essential consideration is the institution of Indirect Rule, established 
by the Brits during the colonial period. Their stated aim was to preserve the North from 
‘disruptive’ outside influences and ‘to foster traditional values and institutions’ (Brukum 
2004). Kingdoms such as that of Dagbon were ‘restored’ and incorporated in the government 
of the colony (McGaffey 2006: 81). The state of authority and administrative efficiency that 
had almost ceased to exist at the end of the 19
th
 century, was restored and codified into a 
                                                          
30 Although all land is vested in the government, the Chiefs act as custodians. Everything that is thus undertaken within the borders of their 
lands, has to be channelled through the Traditional Auhority; their authorisation is required. 
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written constitution at one of the many conference held in the 1930s (see Staniland 1975). In 
this fashion, the British government used Chiefs as pawns to ensure direct control over their 
subjects (Asiedu 2008). However, this meddling in the traditional chieftaincy institution was 
not without consequences. The colonial government imposed traditional leaders favorable to 
them on the people, and disposed the chiefs considered to be unfriendly or adversarial (Albert 
2008; Asiedu 2008). This subordination of traditional leaders was accordingly continued by 
the post-independence governments who continued to manipulate through ‘appoint, discipline, 
and reward the Chiefs’ (Albert, 2008: 49). According to Albert (2008), herein lies the 
intractability and partisan nature of the disputes and conflicts that have plagued the Dagbon 
kingdom ever since.  
Chiefs as Agents of Development 
 When reading the literature on the roles of Chiefs and traditional authority, many 
ascribe them with a role in development (see Mahama 2009b). The Chief is supposed to help 
“fulfill the hopes and aspirations of the community” (Dankwa III 2004). These ‘hopes and 
aspirations’ are often defined in terms of development and according to Oomen (2005) the 
Chiefs are not rarely judged on their ability to bring development to the region. Apparently, 
the community expect him to be an ‘agent of development’ (Mahama, 2009b: 11-12).  
 Having said that, the role of traditional authority in modern government remains 
rather ill-defined. Despite being ascribed with similar agendas – i.e. local community 
development and poverty reduction at large -  the relationship between traditional authorities 
and the DA has not been very well specified. There is no formal partnership nor any 
institutional representation (ibid.). The traditional authorities are just one the many interest 
groups to be consulted by the District Assembly. This can have several negative consequences. 
As Ayee (2006) observes, “the lack of institutional representation of chiefs in the District 
Assemblies and the sub-district structures has led to not only misgivings by most chiefs on the 
operations and performance of the District Assemblies but also a position of non-cooperation 
adopted by either some chiefs or some officials of the District Assemblies especially the 
District Chief Executive”.  
These unintended consequences could seriously hamper the overall development of 
the community. After all, they are the leaders of the community and can in that role be the key 
to the success or failure of any development project. They can fulfil a role in mobilizing 
human and material resources and are an important factor in ensuring peace and tranquillity in 
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their area (Mahama 2009b: 12). It seems a fair point that without peace and order there cannot 
be development. Moreover, chiefs act as an important mediating link between the government 
and his people, acting as channels of communication and disseminating government policies 
and decision (ibid.).  
3.3 Traditional Authority in Practice 
As noted, Yizegu is part of the Dagomba-Kingdom. Traditional authority is thus also 
represented in the community. At the top of this hierarchy is the village-Chief; a man in his 
40s, originally from the neighboring Tarikpaa, but appointed to Yizegu by the Chief of Zugu 
in 2009. He is assisted – and often accompanied - by a group of predominantly unschooled 
elderly men (non-English speaking), who typically act as landlords of their respective families. 
The Chief has named some of these family-heads as his “companions” (9 or 10 for Yizegu, 
including the Assistant-Chief, Imam, and Assistant-Imam) and this position entitles one to a 
piece of land on which to farm. In an interview, the Assistant Chief
31
 points to a hierarchy in 
this process of land-distribution by claiming that his position entitles him “the second pick” 
after the Chief. Payment is done through commission, i.e. the companions do not pay for the 
land in cash but give some of their harvest to the Chief, who in turn gives some bags of maize 
to the Chief of Zugu
32
, the overall land-owner and head of the region. In this fashion, each 
family in the community and region has access to land for farming and is able to sustain itself.  
 Besides the issue of land-distribution, this group of “village elites” also meets up 
twice a week (Mondays and Fridays) to greet the Chief and “discuss problems” of the 
community. They thus seem engaged with the everyday administration of the Yizegu 
community
33
, although none of the interviewees (from the tradition authority itself) seems 
able to substantiate the different aspects of this function. The notion of “solving problems” 
remains rather vague on initial inquiry and my requests for more concrete examples often 
remain unfulfilled. According to the Assistant Chief, “most problems have to do with land. So, 
outside the farming season there is not much to discuss as there is not really anything going 
on. Problems arise when people start farming again”. When asked what they discuss in the 
weekly meetings, the Chief himself explains that “for instance if there are promising kids that 
                                                          
31 The second most important in the Tradtional Autorithy  
32 Although not mandatory, this is seen as the appropriate thing to do.  
33 Later interviews with the more “active” community member made me reject this claim rather confidently for Yizegu itself. However, this 
need not be the case for Chiefs of villages that are higher up the hierarchy and have more (social) capital to mobilize resources (cf. Chief of 
Tolon).   
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do not want to go to school, we go talk to the family. If there are people that mess up their 
jobs, they come here to explain why and we see what we can do”. In terms of development, 
however, none of the traditional “village elites” seem to have an interesting or original vision 
on the biggest problems facing the community and what can be done to solve them. The 
diagnosed problem is usually that “we have no money and there is nothing we can do. We are 
dependent on whoever comes to help us”. Apparently, this is not a very fruitful strategy 
because, as the Chief explains, “the District and NGOs only talk to the paramounts. They 
don’t really care about us. The paramount chiefs do not inform us either”. In that sense, the 
traditional authority in Yizegu takes a rather passive position vis-à-vis other development 
actors, such as NGOs and local government. The often ascribed role of Chiefs as 
“development agents” (see Awedoba 2006; 2009) does not really seem to apply for the 
Yizegu-context 
Perspectives from Villagers 
In inquiring about the role of the Chief in daily life of Yizegu, I uncovered a few 
anecdotes that may offer some clarification. For instance, the region has had a lot of turmoil 
surrounding the issue of pig-holding, as the majority of the Northern Region are of the 
Muslim faith. The surrounding villages that allowed pig-holding had already seen some 
tensions and that is why the Yizegu-chief decided that this activity would be prohibited for all. 
As to keep the peace, he did so in consultation with representatives of both religions. Another 
instance of the Chief’s authority is an issued directive that all farmers should not pay more 
than the agreed upon amount for ploughing, as to improve the community’s bargaining 
position towards the service provider. This directive failed, however, as one farmer - who no 
longer lived in the village but was still using the farmlands – paid the higher price demanded 
by the ploughing “company”, that accordingly asked the same price for all farmers. Note that 
the individual that broke the agreement, had lost the previous “succession-bidding” for the 
open Chieftaincy position. He was thus holding some grudge towards the current Chief and 
saw this as an excellent opportunity to undermine his authority. Other informal talks with 
villagers also uncovered that the traditional authority in Yizegu primarily deals with family-
issues (if the family-head can’t solve them) or feuds between families that affect the entire 
village. These issues can vary from marriage-problems to land-disputes. Moreover, they also 
seem concerned with individuals causing nuisance (“annoying women”) or those who are 
suspected of juju (witchcraft).   
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 Another instance in which the Chief exerted authority, is found in the context of the 
increasing demand for land, in face of the expected development to arise as a consequences of 
the construction of an international airport in close proximity to the village
34
. The frantic 
house-building on the other side of the road arose from the Chief’s announcement that he will 
soon start selling the land to third party bidders, who are anticipating to the increase of land-
value after the construction of the airport has been finished. The demand has thus increased 
significantly. However, as to ensure that the growing families in the community have a place 
to stay in the future, the Chief has given the villagers the opportunity to mark some of the land 
as their territory by allowing them to build houses there. As to guarantee the continuity of the 
community’s existence, he has decided to give them this land for free35. For whoever comes 
around when the land-bidding starts, these building structures will then provide material proof 
as to who owns the place.  
 With regard to development in general, the Unit Committee Chairman (Laseroms) 
told me that “the Chief doesn’t really care. Sometimes we get his blessing if we have big 
plans, but besides that he doesn’t mind if we don’t consult him”36. In the last interview I had 
with the Chief, however, it turned out that he was actually highly offended by the fact that he 
was not really involved in the work of the Unit Committee and Assembly-Man. Remarkably, 
in the three years the assembly-men from Langa has been elected, “he has never come by to 
greet me or discuss issues on development”. Then again the Chief had also not invited him, 
but according to him, this was not his responsibility. Apparently, he was too proud to make 
the first step. This inertia of the traditional authority in terms of development, was 
occasionally criticized by some. As Nathaniel - one of the more politically active and 
articulate villagers - stated, “never in my life have I seen a Chief call up a meeting with the 
community to discuss what can be done in terms of development: they don’t care”. This 
opinion was shared by some of the younger men in the village, who observed that the 
traditional authority “is all about power and status. Normal people don’t benefit. They all 
want to be a Chief. It only creates trouble”. 
                                                          
34 In fact, part of the runway would cut through some of the community’s farmlands. Specifics, however, remained unclear and construction 
has been postponed several times. Other than “the promise of development”, the villagers have not been reimbursed, although it is likely that 
the issue has been dealt with at the paramount level.  
35 The Chief has also been getting requests from former community-members, who have been travelling for a long time and all of a sudden 
want a piece of land, so they can sell it later on when the value has increased. To those people the Chief does not give anything, only if they 
will actually live there.  
36 Direct quote from chapter 2. 
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Particularly this latter point requires some elaboration. As stated, the contest for 
Chieftaincy titles can be highly competitive. For instance, when a position opens up, the 
appointing Chief who decides on the successor will often be overloaded with gifts and it is not 
unusual that the Chieftaincy position goes to the highest bidder. According to many villagers, 
this was the case in the appointment of the new Langa Chief, who was sponsored by his son, a 
wealthy businessman from Accra. Rumours were going around in the region that he had paid 
thousands of cedi’s37, an astonishing and frustrating amount for many of the villagers, who 
already have very little to spend
38
. In the case of Jirikpani, a village low in the hierarchy, this 
“bidding up” even led to the strange situation in which the last 12 months had seen three 
different Chiefs. The Divisional Chief of Zugu kept appointing elderly men who were not in 
the best of health and therefore did not last very long. One of them even died the same night 
he was appointed. In the ceremony I witnessed, the new Chief was not even physically able to 
stand up by himself to put on the ceremonial robe.  
Unity of Traditional Authority: An Illustrating Anecdote 
 In the beginning of January, the Assistant-Chief of Yizegu asked me to tag along to a 
meeting in Zugu in preparation for the yearly Damba-festival
39
. Here I was introduced to the 
paramount chief of the Region, who was presiding a meeting of all assistant-chiefs of the 
villages under his authority, including Yizegu. Each of them handed over some money to 
cover the costs for organizing the festival and gave their respective blessings. The meeting 
was held in Dagbani, although the only person speaking English could sometimes translate. 
The Chief of Zugu accordingly asked me some questions on why I was staying in Yizegu and 
what my intentions were. He mockingly stated that I was staying with the wrong community 
as according to him, “everything happens in Zugu”. A question of one of the assistant-chiefs 
was whether I would bring development to the region
40
, to which I again replied that I had 
neither the means nor resources to do so. After all, “I am only a student”. I was accordingly 
invited to partake in the actual Damba-festival, which would take place the next two days.  
 So far, nothing unusual. Together with the Assistant-Chief, I took the 20 minute 
bicycle-ride back to the village. Upon arrival, however, it was made clear to me that I had to 
                                                          
37 Estimations by one of my key informant came to 300.000 Ghana Cedi, although this seems an unlikely amount. Due to high inflations, 
there are two ratings going around; one that talks in millions and one that deals with hundreds. Most people still think in the old and have 
difficulty converting to the new.   
38 For many villagers, five cedi is already seen as a lot of money.  
39 Which celebrates the birth and naming of the prophet Mohammed.  
40 The most frequently asked question in my time with the community, particularly in the first month.  
41 
 
go see the Chief. At his palace he was already in discussion with a younger man who was 
initially appointed as my personal assistant and usually accompanied me wherever I went. In 
travelling to Zugu, however, I had not informed him and this clearly upset the Chief, who was 
scared that I “would share secrets with the other villages”. Apparently, these other villages 
were not to be trusted. Therefore, I had to reconstruct the meeting and tell him exactly what I 
told the Chief of Zugu. When finished, the Assistant-Chief was also brought in for 
interrogation; apparently the trust relationship between the two men occupying the highest 
positions in Yizegu’s traditional authority was not a very strong one. Later inquiry revealed 
that the Assistant-Chief has always been after the Chief-position and me visiting the 
(Paramount) Chief of Zugu
41
 with “his biggest rival”, had made the Chief rather suspicious. 
Even within the same village, members of the traditional authority are not as unified as I had 
initially thought. To the other villages, they evoke the image of being a unified front – e.g. the 
way each village presents itself at ceremonies; internally, however, divisions and competition 
seem closer to reality.  
Ceremonial Role 
In addition to interviewing the majority of those representing the traditional authority 
in Yizegu, I also attended a number of traditional festivals and ceremonies in some of the 
neighboring villages. The rituals performed during these ceremonies seem important in terms 
of confirming the position of the traditional authority itself; particularly by demarcating those 
who constitute the “traditional elite” from the “commoners”. The drummers have a central 
role in these ceremonies, citing the names of those eligible for the throne and specifying who 
is qualified to participate in what ceremony. Members of the “royal family” perform 
traditional dances wearing smocks, during which they pay the drummers for their service; an 
opportunity many of the younger men and future heirs use to show off not only their dancing, 
but also their wallets. For some, however, these ceremonial commitments are not always easy 
to live up to. For instance, the assistant-chief of my village was more concerned with 
spending his money on ceremonial rituals – like paying the drummers – rather than using it to 
pay off the school fees to keep his children in school.  
Considering the central and eminent position of the Chiefs in these proceedings, the 
ceremonies also seem to play an important role in legitimating their rule. Particularly during 
the Damba-festival - which in my region was hosted by the paramouncy of Zugu - the 
                                                          
41 Who appoints Chiefs. 
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paramount chief is the celebrated man, as all subordinate villages send their representatives to 
pay their respect, literally. 
3.4 Local Politics in Yizegu 
 Another aspect that adds some dynamics to “the community” is the issue of politics. 
Although Ghana has a multi-party system, two parties have dominated Ghanaian politics in 
recent decades. In the current situation, the NDC has been in power since the Presidential 
election of 2008, which ended the 8-year reign of the current opposition party: the NPP. Focus 
will accordingly be on these two parties and their manifestations at the local level of Yizegu.  
In Yizegu, almost all men being a member of one of the political parties, all four 
parties (NPP, NDC, PPP, CPP) have a local chairman who communicates with the higher 
ranks of the party. About the organization of the NDC, their Chairman tells me that if “any of 
the villages has problems, they consult each other about what can be done to solve them. They 
accordingly communicate these problems to the “strong men” in Savelugu who pose them to 
the District Chief Executive”. The NDC thus also has several seats in the District Assembly 
that guard the interest of the political party. As a chairman, he is “the main guy who NDC-
members in Yizegu talk to with their issues about electricity, education, or pipelines”. He 
accordingly informs the assemblyman who poses his concerns in the district and the chairman 
himself also takes the issues up to the Head office in Savelugu. In that sense, he thus works 
through both the local government channel (represented by the assemblyman) and the channel 
of his political party.  
For the NPP, the big opposition party, the situation is rather different. As the NPP-
chairman explains, “since the NDC is in government, we have been stripped of all our powers. 
There is no longer a place for us in the assembly and we are facing a heavy minority. When 
you are in the opposition there is really nothing you can do”. Still, they try to remain active. If 
there is a problem, the area connector (Nathaniel) brings all regional chairmen together for a 
meeting. The fact that they are not represented in the assembly, forces them to work outside 
official governmental channels. As a political party, they have their own projects and NGOs. 
Considering that the assembly is the main local development planning authority, these side 
activities might hamper their coordinating capabilities, particularly in terms of duplication and 
the uneven distribution of development outcomes (i.e. being beneficial to party-members 
only).  
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When asked what differentiates the two parties, members of the NDC often point to 
the their peace-loving nature. As Zachary explains, “we are about freedom for everyone. We 
don’t want fighting, just peace. The other parties only cause trouble”. A big event in this 
regard is the murder of the Chief of Yendi in 2002. According to one NDC-member, “the 
NPP let it happen by not intervening. Everyone could see it coming ”. Similarly, the NDC-
chairman believes that “the NDC is for the community, they want peace in the country. That’s 
the main difference”. Although this may sound like empty rhetoric, intertwinement of politics 
with the Ya-Na murder in specific and traditional authority in general, requires some 
elaboration. As the NPP-chairman explains, “although the traditional authority is not part of 
politics, the Abudu and Adanis-families are both associated with different political parties. All 
Abudus vote NPP and all Adanis vote NDC
42
. Although the Ghanaian constitution states that 
traditional authority and politics should be kept separate, in practice things often turn out 
differently. According to one politically active NPP member, Chiefs usually make sure that 
there some voting discipline with regard to this system, i.e. “we are Adanis, so we vote NDC”.  
In terms of policy, the NPP-chairman does not believe the two parties to be that 
different. Äs he explains, “we all want development for the region. There is not really a 
discussion of what needs to be done. Everyone can see”. He does blame the NDC, however, 
for not “finishing our work. In the years that they have been in power, they have not created 
jobs and threw away our health insurance program”. For the village in particular some 
promises have been broken as well: “they said they would do something about the road and 
the electricity-network. Nothing has been done however”. In that sense, broken promises are 
his biggest critique on the NDC. The NDC-chairman is also critical in this regard, particularly 
to the District Chief Executive (an NDC-appointment) and the promises made during the 
election period. As an example, he names the promise of school-fees that would be taken care 
of. Nothing has happened however: “all they have to do is make sure we can farm properly. 
Then the school fees problem will also be solved. Now both issues are not being tackled”.  
 These broken promises have also disappointed many of the villagers and have called 
up an overall sense of distrust with regard to politicians and government officials. As 
Nathaniel explains, “they come here with all these promises, but when they get to power they 
immediately forget you. Once they have your votes, you’re worth nothing to them anymore”. 
Once elections start, big 4x4s will drive around the region with people shouting insults and 
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 Considering that the district has more members of the Adanis clan, the NDC is typically in the majority in 
Savelugu-Nanton.   
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making promises through megaphones. For Yizegu, the bad condition of the road has always 
has been an issue and “for 25 years politicians have promised they would make it better. It 
doesn’t matter who you vote for, however, nothing ever happens about it”. Still, some see one 
big advantage of politicians as opposed to NGOs. As the Assistant-Imam and founder of the 
local NPP-division explains, “for political parties we have something to offer, namely our 
votes. Especially in election time, they will come around to look at our problems, and 
occasionally we get things done this way. With NGOs it is different, however. They are in no 
way dependable on us. We then have little access to these organizations. At least the 
politicians need something from us”.  
3.5 The Woman’s Perspective 
Women in Yizegu typically rise earliest (around five) and do most of the work in 
keeping up the household. This means – inter alia - cooking for the family, chopping wood for 
making fire, doing the laundry, and fetching water. During the farming season, many of them 
also help out on the land. However, as the men typically hold control over the farm income, 
this seemingly leaves with little financial independence. Some try to start up a trading 
business, while others try to add value to their raw products by making snacks and selling 
them at the market. This allows them to cover the costs of managing the household, i.e. 
buying ingredients for foods, clothing their children, and paying school fees. However, the 
double burden of both supporting the household financially and the challenges of taking care 
of their children, weighs heavy on many young women’s shoulders.  
In terms of interest representation, there are some politically active women in the 
village. For instance, both political parties have a “women’s representative” and there is even 
a general representative that had a seat in the Unit Committee
43
. The filling in of these 
functions may vary, but Ida (NDC Representative and wife of Laseroms) describes hers as 
“going to the women and see what the party can do for them”. Whatever she finds, she 
communicates to the NDC-Chairman of the village who has a direct line higher up the party’s 
hierarchy. She got the task because her predecessor was too old and quit. As she was already 
somewhat politically active, people thought she should fill in the vacancy. The biggest 
problem women have in this community, according to her, is that there is no money to start a 
business as a trader. The little money they have goes into cooking and school fees. “The ones 
                                                          
43 Due to circumstances I only got to speak to the NDC “women’s representation”. The other two represenetatives were away on family 
business.  
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who good are constantly busy buying and selling rice. However, you need some starting 
money to do this. Many women don’t have it”. Via the district and the party they almost got 
an NGO who was willing to invest. At the last moment, however, they backed out for 
unspecified reasons. The NGO that is already active in the community dates back from the 
NPP-era. Therefore, they only give loans to NPP-members. For the NDC-members there is 
currently nothing going on. According to Ida, women are not that active in decision-making; 
access is very hard. This is – she believes - primarily due to the fact that all strong members 
are men. Women’s participation is dependent on the party-elite; however, there are little 
women to be found there.  
Fusina is one of the women participating in  the “politicized” micro-credit program by 
a local investment bank. From these loans, she tries to set up a trading business. By taking in 
rice, sheabutters, and groundnuts for low prices, she can sell them with a profit. This is often 
done by adding value to the raw products by preparing and selling them as snacks at the 
weekly markets or during events and ceremonies. So far she is doing well, predominantly 
because the conditions of the credit-loans are not that demanding. She has 12 months to pay 
back the loans and so far she has always succeeded in doing so. Another advantage she names 
is that this also allows her to use the loans for other expenses, such as sending her children to 
school. Obviously, she has to balance her trading activities with managing the household. 
This is hard work but with the help she gets from the other women in the family she manages 
to get by. In the rain-season she also helps out on the land, and even does some farming for 
herself. The trading business is then put on the back burner.   
 A former women’s community representative – who has retired because of old age - 
diagnoses that one of the major problems of the women in the community is that there is too 
little communication among them. Women typically only work with the other women on the 
compound (i.e. other wives or daughters) and there is little connection with the women from 
other compounds/families. When asked about the issue of interest representation, all women 
attending the interview become rather critical. As the daughter of the former representative 
angrily stated, “they are not sending it”. Interestingly enough, a small boy attending the 
interview states that “speaking English will help”. A lot of women, however, have not 
mastered this language, as the young girls are usually the first to be pulled of school if the 
family can no longer pay the fees. In that sense, women find themselves in a vulnerable 
position in a rural community such as Yizegu. This point is illustrated by an anecdote in 
which the former assembly man had asked each woman 8 cedi with the promise that an NGO 
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would accordingly invest. This never happened, however, and no-one has seen their money 
back. None of the women dare to make a stand. In recent years, their situation has not 
changed much. According to the representative’s daughter, “we are too busy with other 
things”.   
3.6 Other Groups in Yizegu 
Religion 
 Religion also plays an important role in the community. Although the majority of the 
villagers is of the Islam faith, there is a Christian church with a well-attended Sunday morning 
service. Still, the Muslim faith dominates and is also heavily intertwined with traditional 
authority. The Imam does not leave Chief’s side and all traditional ceremonies I have 
witnessed were very centred around (Muslim) prayers and blessings. The assistant-imam 
confirms the importance of their role in stating that “the Chief often asks me for advice from 
the Quran. Also, I open all our meetings with a prayer. Especially when it is time for farming, 
the Chief will ask me to pray for rain”. In that sense, the Islam seems an important source of 
wisdom and support for the Chieftaincy. This also seems to apply to the rest of the village. 
Almost all men and women pray (although separately) five times a day and the Assistant-
Imam often visits families that have problems of a religious nature, i.e. problems with 
marriage 
Both religions are also organized in a platform that brings together the different 
villages in the area. As the Assistant-Imam explains, “the different Imams will often ask 
advice from each other. The different villages need to help each other”. The platform also 
helps them to organize things that require more resources. For instance, Umar – the secretary 
of the Muslim platform – explains that “we make sure there is money so children can have 
Islam-classes. Also, whenever a promising Muslim-student cannot go to school because of the 
fees we see what we can do”. The Christians are also organized in a likewise manner, which 
comes in handy whenever – for instance – the Church needs maintenance. Besides this 
internal organization, both religions have cordial relationship with each other as well. As the 
Assistant-Imam explains, “we often work together and ask each other for advice. There are no 
problems between us”.  
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Youth and Youth Chief 
An interesting category to acknowledge, is that of the Youth. Although Western 
association would have us think this a category of 15-25, it actually stretches from the ages 
18-60. This is further illustrated in an interview with the Yizegu Youth Chief, who reveals 
that he is about 50 years old. He describes his function as being a sort of ‘peacekeeper in 
fighting matters. Whenever they are making problems I tell them that they should not do it’. 
He also keeps in touch with the youth of the village and communicates their problems to the 
Chief. The Chief will then give advice on what to do or, if necessary, take action himself. The 
Youth Chief describes the biggest problem in the fact ‘many of the younger men do not really 
have anything to do. They do not have jobs, they get bored and then they will cause trouble’.  
We should note that this is a group with considerable power. There was an instance in 
Kumbungu in which several youth associations did not agree with who was appointed as the 
new District Chief Executive. Apparently, he had not done a very good job in other District 
and various youth had threatened to beat up any assembly-member who would vote him in. 
According to Nathaniel, who had visited the city just the other day, the main argument for the 
dissatisfaction was that people believed that the proposed DCE “did not care about 
development. That is why nobody wants him. But he is a friend of the president”44. When 
asking Nathaniel for other instances in which the Youth has shown such a violent nature, he 
states that “they will wait outside ballot-boxes and ask people what they have voted. If the 
answer is wrong they will beat you up”. The tension in Kumbungu was eventually by 
controlled by the military police. 
A Telling Anecdote: Keeping Everyone Satisfied 
 On leaving the community, I tried to reciprocate through gifts as much as possible. As 
I had mostly drained the resources of the families of the Assistant-Chief and Assistant-Imam, 
I felt obliged to reimburse with bags of maize. To my surprise this called up some discomfort 
with both men. My personal translator advised me to do give these bags in secrecy because 
otherwise “people will start talking”. It quickly became clear to me that giving gifts to men in 
such a position, would mean they would have to account for them to “their bosses”, i.e. the 
Imam and Chief. Therefore I also had to give these men a considerable gift “so they would 
not get jealous”, as Umar, my “personal assistant” explained. However, when the Chief found 
                                                          
44 Although the sources of these allegations were questionable, it seems rather telling that immediately a sentiment of political distrust 
resurfaces. 
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out that I had given gifts to representatives of the Islam faith, he urged me to also reimburse 
the Christian in one way or the other. After all “he did not want trouble”. This was also the 
reason why I had to do the same for the Youth Chief, “so all groups in the community would 
be satisfied”. It thus seemed that these were the four main groups that kept the community 
balance (Islam, Christians, Youth, and the Traditional Authority). Apparently, matters were 
rather sensitive and the Chief safeguarded the situation.  
3.7 Concluding Remarks 
 Although this chapter has primarily been concerned with mapping out the different 
groups and interests that exist within in the community, what can this lengthy description tell 
us with regard to the issues of interest representation and participation? When studying a 
community that falls under the influence the Dagbon Kingdom, it is inevitable to talk about 
traditional authority. In Yizegu, this group consists of 10 to 15 unschooled elderly men that 
hold a respectful position in the community
45
. The importance of this group is mainly found 
in the land-rights the chief and his companions hold. Thus, if an outsider wants undertake 
something (from development projects to ethnographic fieldwork) in the community, 
permission of the Chief and Village elders must be granted. The Chief’s permission is then a 
sign to the community that everything is in order, accordingly aligning the community with 
whatever is undertaken – for instance – in terms of policy. In that sense, the traditional 
authority can have an important function in mobilizing support and is thus the appropriate 
point of entry for everything that is undertaken in terms of development. This point was 
perhaps underestimated by the Unit Committee Chairman, who believed that “the Chief 
doesn’t mind”. However, the Chief was in fact highly offended that he was kept out of 
development issues by the UCC and Assembly-Man, although he was to proud to do anything 
about it. Still, when looking at the passive position the traditional authority takes vis-à-vis 
other development actors, such as NGOs and local government, the typology of “agents of 
development” does not really apply for the Yizegu context.  
 The traditional authority also revealed severe tension, both within and between 
Chieftaincies. In that sense, the unity of traditional authority is somewhat overestimated. 
Chiefs do not really communicate with their subordinates, while many NGOs and government 
talk to the paramounts under the assumption that they will spread the word. For them this 
counts as having informed the traditional authority as a stakeholder in development, however, 
                                                          
45 For instance, evinced by the humbly kneeling by the normal villagers upon greeting members of the traditional authority. 
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the centralized, hierarchical nature of the Dagbon authority limits the spread of information 
severely. The smaller and less prestigious communities are left out. This often had the Yizegu 
Chief complaining about the fact that “they only inform the paramounts”. Instances of this 
problem where found in negotiations on the construction of the airport and leadership training 
by NGOs to the higher levels of authority (see also chapter 4). Part of the problem lies in the 
Dagbon Kingdom’s nature of succession. This makes the relationship between the Chiefs 
highly competitive as each one tries to get higher up the ladder. For instance, when I travelled 
to a neighbouring village to attend a festival, the Yizegu Chief wanted to know exactly with 
whom I talked. I later found out that he was afraid that I would share secrets with the other 
Chief. Even the fact that I was accompanied by the Assistant-Chief was not enough, as 
apparently no-one was to be trusted, not even his own subordinates.  
 Politics has also made a severe impact on the community. All political parties have a 
local division and almost all villagers are a member of either the NDC (governing party) or 
NPP (opposition). Through the party-channel, the villagers occasionally get things done, 
although this can sometimes have perverse consequences. For instance, NGO-projects run the 
risk of becoming politicized, exclusively falling benefit to members of a particular party. 
Development actors and policy-makers will thus have to be aware of the political context in 
which their policy is implemented, as even in a small village like Yizegu; political disparity is 
to be found. In that sense, the severe national tensions between the two main political parties 
is also found at the local level. The hostile nature of political campaigning, has had its effects 
on the community’s overall position towards government and the opposing political party in 
particular. The big promises made during elections and the meagre results that have come 
from it, have called up an overall sense of distrust towards politicians and government 
officials in general. For instance, NPP-Members structurally blame the current government 
for almost everything (even the weather), while NDC-members blame the NPP for the 
misgovernment in their last term and the according mess their party has to clean up. Although 
ideologically the two parties do not seem that different
46
, the grudges they hold towards each 
other should not be underestimated, particularly in the context of the Dagbon Dispute in 2002 
(see section 3.2).  
                                                          
46 After all, everybody wants development and clearly sees what needs to be done.  
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 Obviously, women are also part of the Yizegu community. However, they remain a 
vulnerable group. The multitude of function they fulfil – not only in the household – makes 
them the busiest group of the community, but perhaps also the most underappreciated. From a 
young age, girls take part in household activities and they are first ones to be dropped out of 
school if the family can no longer pay the school fees of all children. Although some women 
do well in the trading business, as a group they are lacking behind, particularly in terms 
interest representation. There is little organized communication between them and they have a 
hard time getting into political positions that allow for making a difference. Moreover, as one 
of the women stated, “we are just too busy”. In that sense they lack the ‘political tools’ to get 
involved in politics and participation, making them a vulnerable group that often fails to speak 
up whenever their interests are under threat.  
 In conclusion, in light of the above described diversity, the image of a “culturally and 
politically homogeneous social system” (Mansuri & Rao, 2004: 8) does not seem to hold. As 
we have seen, the composition of Yizegu’s “community” is rather diverse. If one then wants 
to obtain an accurate image of reality one need decompose a community along political, social, 
and cultural relations that comprise it. Otherwise one runs the risk of obscuring local 
structures of economic and social power. This can strongly influence policy outcomes, for 
instance by strengthening local elites to the detriment of more vulnerable groups. Therefore, it 
is necessary to move away from a “localism” that essentializes the local as a discrete and 
bounded places that host relatively homogeneous communities (see Mohan & Stokke 2000). 
The community is far from static and are highly subject to influences from the outside
47
. 
Taking these complexities into account will make for more efficient and sustainable 
development policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47  e.g. young boys going to school in Tamale. 
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Chapter 4. Stuck in the Middle: NGOs and Development 
 So far, we have focused on the State and the Community. In this chapter we complete 
the “development triad” by shifting our attention to NGOs. Again, we are working with a 
severely underspecified category as the NGO-label hides an extremely diverse set of 
organizations; ranging from small, informal, community-based organizations to large, high-
profile international NGOs working through local partners across the developing world 
(Banks & Hulme, 2012: 3). Some NGOs seek partnerships as to make use of the qualities at 
both ends of the spectrum; i.e. complementing finance and resources (international NGOs) 
with grass-roots knowledge. Due to the classificatory difficulties to be found in the NGO-
sector, this section will mainly focus on how we can understand their position in terms of 
accountability relations to other actors, i.e. communities, local government and donors. The 
analytical framework will focus on accountability relations and, in particular, the tensions that 
exist between the ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ forms (see 4.1). Then we will present the 
perspectives of NGO-employees on their place in Ghana’s decentralized local government 
system. With this in my mind, we will then return to the local community level and see how 
different forms of development policy have worked “out on the ground”. In a concluding 
section, we will accordingly make an argument on how these findings can be related to the 
arguments expounded in the theoretical section below.  
4.1 Analytical Framework: NGOs and Accountability 
An Appropriate Position? 
It is difficult to take up a straightforward position on the work of NGOs. Fisher (1997: 
442-443) notes how the appropriate role for NGOs in development mainly depends on the 
critical stance one takes towards the development industry. Those, who believe contemporary 
development processes to be flawed but basically positive and inevitable, see how NGOs can 
mitigate some of the weaknesses of the development process. Others, however, see a 
fundamental flaw in the dominant development paradigm and its implementation. In this 
perspective, development is considered to be a historically produced discourse “which created 
a space in which only certain things could be said and even imagined” (Escobar, 1995: 39). 
Although NGOs may be held to facilitate participation and empowerment by critics from both 
camps, the meanings attached to them will differ greatly (Fisher, 1997: 443). 
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 Critics reasoning from the first perspective perceive NGOs mainly in instrumentalist 
terms, regarding them as apolitical tools that can be wielded to further a variety of slightly 
modified development goals (Fisher, 1997: 444). NGOs are praised for their flexibility and 
innovativeness, effectively implementing development efforts, while responding to the grass-
roots needs of local communities (ibid.). To the second set of development critics, however, 
this instrumentalist conceptualization largely ignores the political role that NGOs can play 
(Fisher, 1997: 446). Politics - taken to refer to power-structured relationships maintained by 
techniques of control (Fischer, 1997: 446; Foucault cited in Burchell et al. 1991) – pervades 
every aspect of life and the “antipolitics” described by the former perspective merely serves to 
obscure inherent power relations (cf. Ferguson 1990).  
 There is thus an academic debate between ‘those who argue that new or alternative 
means are needed to reach the goals of development and those who argue for a reconception 
of the ends of development and an acknowledgement that the means by which we strive for or 
make decisions about those ends matter as much as the ends themselves’ (Fisher, 1997; 446; 
Ferguson 1990; Escobar 1995). However, rather than settling this debate and actively 
choosing position, this section tries to incorporate both perspectives and often finds itself right 
in the middle. Although this may seem untidy and ambiguous, the different questions the 
perspectives and tools have to offer can add to the analysis presented below. Therefore, we 
firstly we take up the instrumental tool of accountability in order to analyze the position in 
which NGOs find themselves. Later on we then move to the more to the political side of the 
spectrum in analyzing how these accountability mechanisms work out “on the ground”.   
Upwards and Downwards Accountability  
  At the most general level, the concept of accountability seems concerned with ‘the 
process of holding actors responsible for their actions” (Fox & Brown, 1998: 12). It is 
essentially an attribute of a relationship between two actors, which is described by Edwards 
and Hulme (1996) as “the means by which individuals and organizations report to a 
recognized authority, or authorities, and are held responsible for their actions”. For NGOs, 
accountability works towards three sets of actors (Edwards & Hulme, 1996: 967; Ebrahim, 
2003). Firstly, they are concerned with “upward” accountability referring to relationships with 
donors, foundations and governments (Ebrahim, 2003: 814). Secondly, NGOs are held 
accountable “downwards”, to the groups to whom they provide services, i.e. “the intended 
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beneficiaries” (ibid.). Lastly, they are concerned with “internal” accountability, where NGOs 
declare responsibility to their mission and staff (Ebrahim, 2003: 815).   
 Obviously, there is a tension between these three types of accountability. Particularly 
when focussing on the upward and downward modes of accountability, we can see how 
NGOs are stuck right in the middle. This intermediary position means they will have to deal 
with conflicting demands. The big problem, however, is that typically actors higher up the 
chain – i.e. donors – control the allocation of funds and can thus exert power over those lower 
down the chain. In that sense, the accountability demands that come from above will weigh 
heavier than those coming from below. Powerful actors can easily require accountability from 
the less powerful, while demands coming from the other way will be more easily rejected. 
After all, establishing “downward” accountability requires that actors higher up the chain let 
go of some of their powers, a concession they are often reluctant to make. In that sense, the 
balance is likely to shift in favour of upward-accountability mechanisms, i.e. performance 
indicators, budget reports and the like. This is problematic as (downward) accountability 
mechanisms are primarily there to ensure that funds flow down the aid chain to ‘intended 
beneficiaries’. In practice, however, this might not always be the case.  
NGOs thus find themselves in a difficult position. They act as a mediator between two 
camps that often have contradicting demands. This creates tensions. But what sort of tensions 
are we talking about here? Ebrahim (2003) and Wallace et al. (2007) have described 
extensively how these accountability demands can have an effect on field staff’s priorities, 
usually to the detriment of exploring local social dynamics that should inform their work. 
Moreover, if upward accountability mechanisms weigh too heavily, the pressure might result 
in unreliable reports moving up the aid chain
48
. The work of David Mosse (2004; 2005) has 
been particularly enlightening on how this gap between rhetoric and reality is build up. 
Sometimes policy does not produce practice, but it is rather the other way around. Sometimes 
actors in development are merely concerned with maintaining coherent representations, 
regardless of events.  
One of the main problems is that, in light of results-based management, project-
management is often a top priority for management (Jacobs & Wilford, date unknown). Such 
systems are often rather inflexible in bureaucratic processes. However, fieldwork requires 
                                                          
48  E.g. “juking the stats”: “Making robberies into larcenies. Making rapes disappear. You juke the stats, and majors become colonels” (The 
Wire,  4.9). 
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flexibility as to quickly respond to changing realities on the ground (Wallace et al. 2007: 165). 
Moreover, predetermined plans reduce beneficiaries to mere actors in NGO-activities rather 
than authors of their own. This inhibits them from taking ownership in project activities and 
partaking in political processes. Although planning and budgeting is necessary, it should be 
constantly informed by locals and their perspectives and priorities. Therefore, downward 
accountability has to come first. In the current situation, however, it is often the other way 
around.  
4.2 The NGO-Perspective 
Relationship with Local Government 
Formally, all development aid is channelled through the District Assembly. According 
to a DMR
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-employee, “they know about the communities, what needs to happen and who 
needs the help most”. The NGOs thus negotiate with the District Chief Executive to see if 
there is a fit between what the NGO has to offer and what the District needs. If this is the case, 
the District will select several communities the NGOs accordingly pays a visit for a 
consultation-meeting. This meeting is usually with the “village elites”. Dependent on what 
specialization the NGO has, the District will also link them to the relevant government 
department/agency. In that sense, many NGOs work in close cooperation with local 
government and name the DA as their “point of entry”. Moreover, many NGOs see the 
necessity of this “state consent”: as the reasoning goes, they have the capability of 
coordinating and monitoring the overall development policy. In this fashion, issues like 
“duplication of policy” can be averted. 
 However, in practice this system does not always function up to standards. As a 
JUNO-employer explains “most of the planning administrators do is desk-planning. They lack 
the institutional capacity for any serious implementation, particularly at the sub-district level. 
They are writing a lot of nice rapports and proposals in order to secure financing. However, 
the money is often spend on other things”. He mainly believes that this malfunction also has 
to do with the fact that the decentralization is not yet complete. As the budgets confirm, the 
District is very limited in its funding and has great difficulty in generating internal revenue. A 
lot of money is spend on salaries, meaning there is little left for actually implementing policy. 
Moreover, the financing that comes from central government is often too late and incomplete. 
In that sense, “you can write a nice plan, but there is not really any money to make it happen. 
                                                          
49 All NGO-names are given synonyms  
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There are no resources to address development priorities. The overall setup is good, but the 
district cannot and does not deliver”.  
 This is also the reason why many NGOs have chosen to focus on giving technical and 
financial support, i.e. a move from direct service delivery to advocacy. As the director of 
CLOUDS explains, “the circumstances have changed. When we started in ’93, poverty was so 
severe that we had to focus on delivering basic needs. After all, when people are hungry they 
don’t care about basic rights. Nowadays, however, we do more about raising the level of 
awareness with regard to basic rights and the democratic process; everybody has a stake in the 
national cake”. This means that they have to collaborate closely with the community and 
governmental actors. The JUNO-employee agrees; “without a government system, 
development aid is unworkable. NGOs should be temporarily, the state is there forever. That’s 
why the focus should be on improving them”. Eventually, they have to deliver the service. In 
the current form, however, NGOs often have to “fill the gaps that the government leaves”. 
Almost all interviewed employees agree that this is not the way it is supposed to be; “NGOs 
should produce development outcomes alongside government actors rather than doing it for 
them”. 
Taking the Social and Cultural Contexts into Account 
Many NGOs take into account the context in which much of the development policy is 
delivered. Firstly, they have to deal with the fierce political competition that takes place, also 
at the local level. For instance, the CLOUDS-director names an example of a perfectly 
working grinding mill that would benefit the whole community, but was only used by 
members of a particular political party. According to him, “if development aid gets 
intertwined with politics, its produced outcomes will often be distributed unequally”. 
Instances of this politicization where also found in Yizegu, where the problem manifested 
itself in a micro-financing programme that only benefited members of the NPP. That is why 
many NGOs find it important to emphasize their political neutrality, especially in election 
periods. For instance, CLOUDS wants “nothing to do with anyone that has a party-political 
affiliation. They should stay away from anything that can be associated with our organization. 
If our employees want to be in politics they will have to quit their jobs or take a lengthy 
leave”. Staying out of politics is a challenge, however, because politicians will always want to 
claim positive developments as their merit.  
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 With regard to the Traditional Authority, many NGOs are in concordance on their 
perceived role in development. Several NGO-employees see it as the “proper entry” into the 
community. In a sense, they are the leaders of the community and should therefore be 
included in the development process; “they have to carry the development projects once the 
NGO is gone”. As one DARE-international employee named it, “they are the pivots of 
mobilizing community resources”. Their well-respected status in the community can make 
them a real factor of influence. Moreover, Chiefs are “the custodians of the land” and if you 
want to undertake something in a community, you have to inform them. Still, some NGOs 
emphasize that the role and functions Chiefs fulfil, will depend highly on their personal 
characteristics. Not all chiefs have the same degree of skill in mobilizing resources, or the 
same level in involvement for that matter. Sometimes it has to come from both sides.  
 Although, the NGOs thus very much take into account the needs and roles of the 
traditional authority, some faulty assumptions also seem to guide their work, particularly 
when taking the situation of Yizegu into consideration. For instance, a training given by one 
of the NGOs merely focused on the paramount Chiefs, under the assumption that “they will 
inform the others”. As seen in many instances, however, the communication between 
divisional, local and paramount-chiefs is very weak, as the higher ranks do not feel the need 
to visit or inform their subordinates: they would rather see it the other way around.  Moreover, 
some NGOs rather work with the Unit Committee Chairman than traditional authority 
institutions. However, as we saw with the Chief of Yizegu, surpassing him was a severe sign 
of disrespect, although he was to proud to say anything about it. Leaving him out of the 
communication process, made sure he could not fulfil his role in mobilizing the community 
and that way gathering the needed support for the intended policy. The Director of the 
Institute of Local Governance believes that this problem often lies “at the basis of much of the 
development failures that have been going on at the local level”.   
Problems with Accountability 
 With regard to the difficult situation in which many NGOs find themselves in terms of 
accountability, some employees were rather critical towards the functioning of their own 
organization. Some even talked about the “screwed up mechanisms of the development 
industry”. As the Director of CARD explains, “the NGOs report upwards. How do they get 
the money? Not by doing good things for the community. They make sure the donors are 
happy when they come visit. Just stick them in a nice hotel and you will be fine”. An 
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employee of DARE-international even calls the concept of “downward-accountability” an 
illusion. “There are a lot of reports written in which everyone presents good performances and 
nice indicators. That needs to be done because that is how the financing works”. However, 
this is often to detriment of the work done in the communities. The Directors of CARD agrees, 
“the reality of development cannot be captured by an indicator. NGOs are very good at 
writing reports. However the community is often forgotten”. His accusations go even further 
when stating that “in development the sequence is as follows: first NGOs take care of 
themselves, then of the Donors that come. What remains goes to the communities”.50  
4.3. Development Projects in Yizegu 
 Although the NGO-perspective gives us a broad overview of how they work with the 
local government structure with which they are presented, it might also be enlightening to 
map out the community’s experiences with NGOs. A focus here is on rural development and 
the various financing schemes in which many of the villagers have participated. For an 
accurate assessment, however,  some context is required. 
Farming Life in Yizegu 
The people of Yizegu are mostly smallholder farmers whose farming is predominantly 
subsistence. Each compound has a landlord – the landowner - who is responsible for feeding 
the people living there. The farming activity takes place during the rain-season which lasts 
from May till October. In March, some farmers will already start planting yams. In May they 
plant the granats (peanuts), and in June the rice and maize. A typical day for those farming, 
starts between 5 and 6, early in the morning. Most farmers partly work on the land of the 
landlord and use the rest of their day to farm their own land. The crops vary from tomatoes, 
peppers, cowpea, and rice to beans, granats, and maize. Families live of the harvest of last 
year’s farming season. Some years are better than others, although one problem keeps 
surfacing each season: a lack of fertilizer. Because of this, most families barely have enough 
yield to feed their families. Almost nothing remains for them to sell at the week-markets of 
Savelugu or Kumbungu. Moreover, there is barely any money to invest in farm-inputs in 
preparation of next year’s farming season. One of the younger man, who farms for the 
assistant-Imam, described the situation in which many of the Yizegu farmers find themselves 
as a downward cycle, in which “each year gets worse”.  
                                                          
50 A cautionary not should be made that these observations are by no means generalizable. Although the accusations are severe and might 
hold some truths, I must emphasize that was very much impressed by the work and perspectives of many of the NGOs that I talked too. 
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This year has been particularly hard because large parts of last year’s harvest failed 
due to sustained drought and a fire that destroyed much of the crops. Many farmers then do 
not have the money to buy the needed fertilizer for harvesting their main crops, i.e. maize and 
rice. A possible outcome is to participate in a financing project of one of the NGOs that 
supply farming inputs and ask a (predetermined) share of the farmer’s yield in return. These 
faming inputs include seeds, fertilizer, agrochemicals, ploughing services, transportation 
possibilities, storages and marketing. By using these farming inputs “correctly”, or so the 
ideal scenario tells us, the farmers will get a high enough yield from their crops to not only 
pay back the lender and feed their families, but also to sell some goods at the market in order 
to set up a business. However, this scheme is not without risk. Even if the yield is 
disappointing, the farmers are still stuck to the contract that demands that they hand over the 
agreed upon bags of maize in exchange for the loans. Some of the farmers may then find 
themselves in a choice between defaulting the loan or feeding their families. It should come as 
no surprise that almost all of villagers prefer the latter option.   
 One of the farmers in the village has worked closely with one of these “financial 
NGOs” (CARD) and states the specifics of the contracts that many famers have signed in the 
past farming season. “The deal was that the farmers would get the “adequate” farming inputs 
for 5 bags of maize per acre. However, it quickly became clear that many would not get that 
high a yield out of their soils. Some got 2, others 4, some 7, and some 5”.  Many farmers were 
thus not able to pay off their debts, and many of those that could, simply refused. Because of 
the many defaults, the NGO accordingly threatened to bring in the police and have them pay 
their debts “in one way or the other”. He believes that they  will probably not come back this 
year,  meaning that many farmers relying on these loans will be in trouble. Those who can, try 
to benefit from the lower prices and are already stocking up on fertilizer. Others are using 
their cattle to produce natural fertilizer. Farmers that do not have these possibilities, however, 
have a difficult time ahead of them. 
The strict conditions of the contracts and bad experiences in the past, were also reason 
enough for many farmers to not partake in these types of “development projects” at all. As 
Mohammed, a young farmer, explains, “they ask too much. You can’t keep anything for 
yourself.  At least now, everything I farm is for me. If I get one bag of rice, I can sell it, 
otherwise I would have to give it to CARD. They’ll take the crops and it won’t be profitable”. 
Moreover, according to Zachary, a farmer who was closely involved with another financing 
project (AGRA), the support they were getting was getting less and less anyway. As he 
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explains, “the first year, I got fertilizer for 5 acres. I paid back the loans on time, but next year 
I only got enough for two acres. They didn’t even tell me why”. This year, he will not be 
participating at all, because he does not want to “owe anything to anyone”. Perhaps if they 
can get better conditions on the loans, he will think about it, but this depends on what the 
District Chief Executive can get out of the negotiation. They themselves do not really have a 
say in it. Apparently, “each year a guy comes with a list and collects the names of those that 
want the loans”. The loans they are getting is more deal of “take it or leave it”.  
 Another  option for the villagers, is to obtain a piece of land from the irrigation fields 
of Libga, another large-scale development project in the region Some villagers have the 
resources to do so and explain how it works. “If you give a sum of money to the Libga-chief 
or one of his companions, they will rent you the land”. However, the ground is a bit more 
expensive because the people from Libga according have to pay the Ghanaian government for 
using the dam. You thus need a considerable amount of money to begin with. The big 
advantage, however, is that the irrigation allows them to also farm in the dry-season. Some of 
the crops they farm are peppers, African spinach, and ocru. Irrigation farming is intensive 
though, and you are still highly dependable on the weather. If it is very hot, then business 
goes well and they make some money from selling their products at the markets. This money 
is accordingly used to buy farm inputs to prepare for farming in the rain-season. The majority 
of the farmers in Yizegu, however, are not wealthy enough to make use of these irrigation 
facilities.  
Other Instances of Development Projects In Yizegu 
 Enoch, the man who has served as an assembly-man for eight years, provided some 
other example of problems they have had with development organization. For instance, 
Yizegu and the neighboring village of Tarikpaa do their farming on different soils (gravel vs. 
sand). This also means that they have different farm cycles and “while the people in Yizegu 
might still be relaxing, the farmers of Tarikpaa are already working hard”. However, because 
they fall under the same electoral area, they also fall under the same development policy. 
NGOs thus supply them farm-inputs (at a loan) at the same time, while one of the villages 
does not actually need it yet. This mistiming of aid often leads to a lower yield and a default 
of the loan. Frustrated NGOs accordingly blame the community for a lack of knowledge and 
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stop the program, while a better communication could have saved a lot of trouble
51
. A similar 
diagnostic is applicable to much of the microcredit provided by NGOs. This is often done in 
the dry-season when supply of goods is low, and prices are thus high. If this microcredit 
would have been given just after harvest, however, women could invest it way better due to 
the high supply and accordingly low prices. This would lead to a lot less loan-defaults and 
thus a lot less frustration for all. More informed policy – for instance through the means of 
participation – would have helped a great deal in this regard. Perhaps this also the reason why 
projects that require a bit more delicacy due to their complexity – e.g. agriculture - often fail. 
More straightforward NGO-projects in the areas of water, sanitation and education, for 
instance, have helped the community considerably. 
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
 This chapter has set out to complete the “Development Triad” by adding the NGOs as 
third actor in the process. In the analytical framework we accordingly conceptualized their 
position in terms of accountability relations. The according argument that flowed out of the 
intermediary position in which NGOs find themselves, is that the different and contradictory 
demands they face from donors and ‘intended beneficiaries’ (i.e. upward and downward 
accountability) places them in a difficult position. As the literature argued, the Donors would 
often get privileged in the subsequent trade-off. To put these claims to the test we accordingly 
confronted NGO employees themselves.  
 When working in Ghana, one is inevitably confronted with an elaborate local 
government system which requires them – by law – to work through the District Assembly. 
Most interviewed NGOs were fully aware of this obligation and acknowledged the 
importance of an adequate governance system as such. Most negotiation and bargaining is 
thus done with the District Chief Executive, who will accordingly tell them were to go. 
However, the perceived effectiveness of this system is based on the assumption that the 
District will actually know where to go. As Johnson (2001) observed in chapter 2, 
development programs can be highly subject to regional biases. Chances then are that the 
District will send the NGOs to relatively affluent areas or communities with considerable 
local power. This might result in an unequal distribution of development outcomes. The 
                                                          
51 We should note that sometimes no-one is to blame for development failure. As one farmer noted, “last year everything was on time, they 
even gave us money for ploughing. However, the drought and lack of rain ruined everything”. The fact that the NGO accordingly stated they 
wouldn’t be back next year because of the according default can be morally questioned however. 
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varying numbers of development projects to which each community lays claim, seems to 
support this line of reasoning (see introduction). 
 With regard to taking into account the social and cultural context in which 
development policy is implemented, most NGOs are very careful in their proceedings. Many 
believe that the Chief is the appropriate ‘point of entry’ in a community, although some prefer 
to work through the Unit Committee Officer. As chapter 2 illustrated, this can have negative 
consequences with regard to the potential role of chiefs in development. Also many NGOs 
seem to overestimate the unity of Traditional Authority, as we had already concluded in 
Chapter 3. The assumption that information or policy outputs will just trickle down the 
hierarchical of the Dagbon traditional authority does not hold and merely leads to elites 
capturing the available resources of development projects.  
` The position in which NGOs find themselves in terms of accountability was also 
critically analyzed by some of the interviewed personnel. The concerns with regard to results-
based management as found in the literature, were confirmed in talks with several NGOs. 
Sometimes, getting the budgets and performance indicators right is more important than 
assessing how the actual policy works out “on the ground”. In that sense, goal-displacement 
seems prevalent in the NGO-sector, where outputs are favored over outcomes. In this process, 
communities are often forgotten. After all, showing the results in actual numbers is more 
likely to get your projects financed than pointing to the complex social and cultural dynamics 
that have to be taken into account for “the slow and delicate process of development”. One 
interviewee even went so far as to call “downward” accountability an illusion. In safeguarding 
the financing, the power of Donors simply weighs too heavily on the NGO’s shoulders, who 
are – as an organization – also concerned with their own survival.  
 But then what have we seen of development policy in practice? For Yizegu, there are 
two sides to the story. Some projects have been relatively successful, such as the installed 
water pumps and a planted forest that provides the village with wood for all sorts of purposes. 
In terms of rural development, however, the community has not seen much success. We have 
seen instances in which simple communication and information provision could have saved a 
lot of trouble. However, we have also seen instances in which the demands of contract-
farming turned out to be unreasonable to almost the entire community. Negotiation on the 
terms could have helped a lot in this regard, but was perhaps already done at the District 
Level. In that sense, local beneficiaries should have been placed in a better position to make 
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their priorities and preferences known. A position which Ghana’s local government system 
apparently did not provide. 
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5.Conclusion 
5.1 The Story of Yizegu?  
We started out with a village that, in terms of general development, had clearly fallen 
behind compared to the other villages in its surroundings. The story of this ethnography thus 
became that of a small farming community struggling to make its voice heard in an attempt to 
direct development policy in its favour. Therefore, the focus was initially on the process of 
interest representation as a possible explanation for the observed exclusion. This choice, 
however, forced us to widen our scope, quickly dragging local government structures and 
NGOs into the analysis. The story of Yizegu thus quickly changed into that of a recognized 
unit in Ghana’s local government system. Their interests had to be communicated all the way 
up to the level of the District Assembly, the political arena in which the development cake is 
divided and NGOs are brought into contact with communities. So, in the context of this 
governance system, what exactly does it mean to be at ‘the bottom’? And when ‘looking up’, 
what is it you see? Moreover, when communicating your interest at the lowest level, what 
happens to it in face of the wide variety of other actors present in the same political arena?  
And is this ‘interest’ really as straightforward and unified as the local government setup 
would have us believe? The fieldwork and according analyses have tried to give an answer to 
these types of questions. Three analytical chapters were written, of which the conclusions will 
be briefly summarized. After this, an overall conclusion is drawn that brings together the 
separate findings and tells us the (ethnographer’s subjective) ‘story of Yizegu’.  
Chapter 2 introduced Ghana’s local government system, in a context of democratic 
decentralization. Here we saw the contrast of an elaborate Local Government Act, full of 
professional implementing and monitoring agencies, and the comical sight of Laseroms - the 
Unit Committee Chairman - dictating the names of families to a schoolboy acting as a stand-
in accountant. This image illustrates exactly what is wrong with the current setup of the 
governance system: all the laws are in place but without the institutional capacity and 
resources to make it work, the intended goals of democratic decentralization are still far out of 
reach. This ‘incomplete decentralization’ is also an important source of frustration for many 
villagers. Although they get the feeling they are allowed to ‘participate’ - for instance through 
the unit committee or the yearly meeting in which they list their top 10 priorities – nothing 
really happens eventually. To the village this is a sign of corrupt politicians, assembly-men 
who do not listen, and NGOs that won’t help them. However, the financial and material 
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constraints of the District make sure their hands are tied as well. In that sense, having the 
community participate gets their hopes up initially, but only leads to more disappointment in 
the long run. 
In chapter 3, we mapped out the different groups and interests that exist within in the 
community. Rather than viewing the community as unified actor in the development triad, 
social and cultural dynamics were added to the equation, subsequently dismantling the image 
of  the community as a “culturally and politically homogeneous social system” (Mansuri & 
Rao, 2004: 8). By decomposing the community and describing the political, social, and 
cultural relations that constitute it, the notion of community-based development is 
problematized. Different groups exist within the community and not taking the observed 
heterogeneity in the account can lead to all sort of intended consequences and perverse effects 
of development policy. For instance, when entering a community one needs to acknowledge 
the Chief’s position as the leader of the community. Failing to do so can be counterproductive 
in terms gaining support for development policy. Also, not acknowledging the political 
context might lead to development benefits being captured by particular interests, e.g. 
members of a certain political party. A similar caution is needed in the participation of women. 
Their subordinate position in a patriarchal society, makes them a vulnerable group whose 
voices can be easily drowned out by their dominant husbands. These consideration and 
complexities have to be taken into account in studies of interest representation. After all, as 
this chapter demonstrates, whose interest is actually represented in name of “the community” 
is not as straightforward as instrumental views on participation and interest representation 
would have us believe.  
Chapter 4 completed the “Development Triad” by shifting the focus to the work of 
NGOs. Here it was revealed that NGOs primarily do their communication with the local level 
at the District, under the assumptions that the District Assembly will know where to go. 
However, considering the already highlighted problems of the incomplete Local Government 
System, some possible negative consequences should be noted. For instance, as Johnson 
(2001) observed, development programs can be highly subject to regional biases. Chances 
then are that the District will send the NGOs to already relatively affluent areas (that thus 
have something to offer) or those communities with considerable local powers (e.g. 
prestigious Chieftaincies). This might result in an unequal distribution of development 
outcomes, of which Yizegu may have been victim. Moreover, communication done at this 
level might overlook valuable information and nuance to be found at the community-level, As 
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seen with the wrong timing of farm-input delivery, these miscommunications often form the 
basis of many of Yizegu’s past development failures. Lastly, although overall NGOs seem 
considerably sensitive to the social and cultural contexts in which their projects are 
implemented, other problems were found in overestimating the unity of traditional authority. 
Here, it was often assumed that policy benefits and information given to paramounts would 
trickle down the hierarchical ladder accordingly. The competitive and authoritative nature of 
the Dagbon Kingdom, however, proved this assumption to be false.  
From all this we make up that three categories are involved in producing development 
outcomes: local government actors, NGOs, and “the community”. While an instrumental 
perspective would have us over-essentialize these categories by presenting them as separately 
defined, unified actors, the analysis presented above has proven this image to be unfeasible.  
Not only do all three “actors” seriously overlap and mutually influence each other, their 
compositions also vary considerably, as evinced by the multitude of organizational forms that 
carry the NGO label, or the social, political, and cultural divisions that make up “the 
community of Yizegu”. Moreover, this “development triad” is embedded by a national and 
even global context, that resonates all the way down to the locality, i.e. Yizegu (cf. Tsing 
2000). After all, when looking at the local government system, we see how it echoes a once 
dominant global development discourse of participatory development. We also see a District 
Assembly that is severely influenced by central government and line ministerial controls, 
hollowing out local people’s (i.e. Yizegu’s) participation and control (see Wardell & Lund 
2006). Moreover, when looking at the NGO-sector, we see organizations struggling for 
survival (i.e. financing) in the face of a global system that forces them to be accountable to 
donors rather than communities (i.e. Yizegu). One can even go so far as to conclude that we 
see communities torn up by the initiation of traditional authority structures that date back to 
British colonialism. In that sense, Mohan and Stokke (2000: 263) seem correct in their 
assertion that places “are constituted by social, economic, political, and cultural relations, and 
flows of commodities, information and people that extend far beyond a given locality”. 
So where does this leave Yizegu? Obviously, their story is one of a lack of access. 
Although the Assembly building is only 10 kilometres away, to many of the villagers, what 
happens behind these doors remains a mystery. However, one also needs to ask the question 
of whether this ‘access’ really provides an outcome. After all, we should seriously consider 
the possibility that the chosen metaphor of getting your slice of the pie is misguided. What if 
the slices have already been taken, leaving only the crumbs to divide. A glance at the 
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depressing state of the District’s budget seems to support this line of reasoning. In that sense, 
the story of Yizegu perhaps becomes a rather tragic one. It becomes a story of an unschooled 
Chief that patiently waits for government and NGOs to come help him, while perhaps he 
should be a bit more concerned about what he himself can do for his community to make 
things better. It becomes a story of frustrated young men, who have finished their school but 
are stuck in the village because jobs are not up for the taking. It becomes a story of sons who 
see their fathers and uncles more concerned with saving face in traditional ceremonies, rather 
than paying for their school fees to continue education. A story of women struggling to 
balance their roles as mothers, traders, farmers, and wives. But above all, it becomes a story 
of people doing the best they can to cope with the limitations with which they are confronted 
and the unfortunate situation in which they find themselves.   
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